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1 INTRODUCTION
In his seminal contribution, Coase (1937) raised one of the most fundamental questions in economics: What
determines firm boundaries? Virtually every firm has to decide whether to cooperate with its business part-
ners at arm’s-length or integrate them to some degree into its boundaries. A profound understanding of this
integration decision is required more than ever in the age of globalization, characterized by the emergence of
multinational corporations that span their boundaries across several countries.1 All theoretical explanations
of firm boundaries provided to date recognize the fundamental importance of contractual imperfections (cf.
Gibbons, 2005), which arguably depend on the quality of contracting institutions. Thus, the large inter-
national differences in judicial quality prevailing across the globe should play a key role in shaping firm
boundaries. Yet, the direction of this effect is a priori not clear. Do better contracting institutions induce
firms to be more or less deeply integrated? To answer this question, this paper develops a parsimonious
theoretical model of the relationship between contracting institutions and firm boundaries and tests its pre-
dictions using a unique micro dataset of ownership shares across half a million firm pairs worldwide.
While existing theories of the firm agree on the importance of contractual imperfections for shaping firm
boundaries, they make opposite predictions regarding the effect of contracting institutions on the optimal
degree of integration. To illustrate this point, consider the two classical theories of the firm: the Transaction-
Cost Theory (TCT) by Williamson (1971, 1975, 1985) and the Property-Rights Theory (PRT) by Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).2 Under both theories, we examine a production relationship
between two parties, a firm’s headquarters (HQ) and a manufacturing producer. If courts cannot fully enforce
contracts between the parties, and if the producer needs to invest into relationship-specific inputs, then these
investments are plagued by a hold-up problem. According to the TCT, the HQ can eliminate the resulting
inefficiencies by integrating the producer into firm boundaries at the expense of an exogenous governance
cost. In this theory, better contracting institutions in the producer’s country mitigate the hold-up problem
in arm’s-length transactions, and therefore make integration less attractive. By contrast, the PRT argues
that contractual imperfections cause hold-up inefficiencies even within firm boundaries. By integrating the
producer, the HQ obtains residual control rights over non-contractible inputs, but undermines the producer’s
incentives to invest into these inputs. According to the PRT, better contracting institutions in the producer’s
country reduce the need to incentivize the producer, and therefore make integration more attractive.3 Hence,
the predictions of the two theories regarding the effect of contracting institutions on firm boundaries are
diametrically opposed.
Which of the two competing hypotheses finds empirical support? As a first glance at the relationship
between the degree of integration and contracting institutions, Figure 1(a) plots the ownership shares of more
1UNCTAD (2011, 2013) estimates that multinationals accounted for one quarter of world GDP and participated in 80% of world
trade in 2010, with more than one third of world exports traded within multinational firms’ boundaries. See Barba Navaretti and
Venables (2004) for stylized facts on the growing significance of multinationals over time.
2These two theories are among the most acclaimed in organizational economics (see e.g. Whinston, 2003). They have also been
instrumental in understanding the boundaries of multinational firms; see Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003, 2005) for a TCT
view, and Antràs (2003) as well as Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008) for a PRT perspective.
3The original work by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) does not provide a testable prediction regarding
the effect of contracting institutions on firm boundaries. Hence, we formally derive this PRT prediction in our paper.
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than half a million firm pairs from more than one hundred countries in 2014, recorded in the Orbis database
by Bureau van Dijk (BvD), against the rule of law index of the subsidiary’s country – a standard measure of
the quality of contracting institutions.4 We observe a positive and significant correlation between ownership
shares and judicial quality, suggesting that subsidiaries tend to be more deeply integrated in countries with
better contracting institutions. This observation runs counter to the TCT logic, but it is in line with the PRT.
FIGURE 1: Ownership shares and contracting institutions
(a) By subsidiary’s country
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(b) By country and relationship-specificity
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Note: The graphs plot mean values of ownership shares (exceeding 10%) of firm pairs against the rule of law index of the sub-
sidiary’s country in the cross-section of 2014. In Figure 1(a), the ownership shares are arithmetic means by the subsidiary’s country.
In Figure 1(b), the ownership shares are arithmetic means by the subsidiary’s country and the relationship-specificity category of
the subsidiary’s industry, whereby ‘low’ relationship-specificity means that the industry contains zero differentiated or reference-
priced products according to the liberal Rauch (1999) classification, for ‘intermediate’ specificity the share of these products lies
between zero and one, and ‘high’ reflects a share equal to one. The lines are obtained from univariate regressions of the mean
ownership shares on the rule of law index, whereby each observation is weighted by the underlying number of firm pairs. In Fig-
ure 1(a), the estimated slope parameter is 5.639 with a t-value of 2.65 (based on robust standard errors), the R2 is 0.026, and the
sample is based on N=605,547 firm pairs. In Figure 1(b), for low relationship-specificity the slope is 1.577 (t=0.90, R2=0.002,
N=25,751), for intermediate specificity it is 4.818 (t=2.15, R2=0.023, N=104,014), and for high specificity it is 5.583 (t=3.10,
R2=0.027, N=101,172).
It is well-known that contractual imperfections per se do not necessarily lead to hold-up inefficiencies.
It is the combination of contractual incompleteness and relationship-specificity – defined as the extent to
which investments have a higher value within a given relationship than outside of it – that causes ‘lock-in’
and hold-up (see e.g. Joskow, 2005). Hence, one would expect a differential impact of contracting insti-
tutions depending on the degree of relationship-specificity of a subsidiary’s investments. More precisely, a
high degree of relationship-specificity magnifies the respective effect of contracting institutions predicted by
either theory of the firm. According to the TCT, the negative impact of contracting institutions on the attrac-
tiveness of integration is particularly pronounced in industries with high degrees of relationship-specificity,
since the hold-up problem in those industries is relatively more severe (see Antràs, 2015). Conversely, as we
formally show in this paper, the PRT predicts a positive interaction effect between the quality of contracting
institutions and the degree of relationship-specificity of producers’ goods on the optimal ownership share.
Figure 1(b) provides a first assessment of this interaction effect. It distinguishes subsidiaries’ industries
4For the purpose of illustration, we plot mean ownership shares aggregated by country (Figure 1(a)) or by country and
relationship-specificity of the subsidiary (Figure 1(b)), instead of the myriad of individual observations at the level of firm pairs.
However, the regression lines are weighted by the underlying numbers of firm pairs, so they represent correlations in the raw data.
The data are described in detail in Section 3.2.
2
by their degree of relationship-specificity, measured by the share of differentiated goods according to the
Rauch (1999) classification. The figure reveals that the positive correlation between ownership shares and
the rule of law index is strongest for subsidiaries operating in industries with a high degree of relationship-
specificity; the correlation is slightly weaker for intermediate degrees of relationship-specificity, and it is
small and insignificant in non-specific industries. Hence, the patterns observed in the raw data do not match
the TCT view but square well with the PRT predictions.
To formalize the above arguments, we set up a theoretical model in the spirit of the PRT. Motivated
by our empirical setup, this framework generalizes the conventional PRT of the multinational firm (as in
Antràs, 2003) in three respects. First, the key novel feature of our model is that the HQ faces a continuous
integration decision and chooses the equilibrium ownership share in the producer, rather than deciding only
between the two extreme cases of full integration and arm’s-length transactions. Second, we allow for partial
contractibility, in the sense that courts can verify and enforce a fraction of the producer’s investments into
inputs, and this fraction may vary across countries with different quality of contracting institutions (as in
Acemoglu et al., 2007; Antràs and Helpman, 2008). Third, rather than assuming that the producer’s inputs
are fully customized to a given relationship, we consider partial relationship-specificity and allow the degree
of customization to vary across industries.5 Given that the producer’s investments are not fully contractible,
the parties bargain over the distribution of the surplus from the relationship ex-post (i.e., after all inputs
have been produced). This setup is characterized by a hold-up problem and ex-ante underinvestment by the
producer. As a result, the HQ’s ownership decision involves a simple trade-off between her share of the
surplus generated by the relationship and the size of this surplus.6 Intuitively, an increase in the ownership
share shifts residual control rights between the two parties: It increases the HQ’s outside option but reduces
that of the producer. This improves the HQ’s bargaining position and allows her to reap a larger share of the
surplus in ex-post negotiations. Yet, the producer anticipates the stronger hold-up associated with a higher
ownership share of the HQ, so his underinvestment becomes more severe, and the surplus size decreases.
Our generalized PRT model delivers the following two key predictions, which rationalize the patterns
observed in Figure 1. First, it predicts a positive relationship between the optimal ownership share and the
quality of contracting institutions in the producer’s country. Intuitively, if courts can verify and enforce
contracts on a larger share of inputs, the need for incentivizing the producer’s investments decreases. Con-
sequently, the HQ integrates the producer more deeply in order to obtain a larger fraction of the surplus.
Second, the positive effect of contracting institutions on the optimal ownership share is predicted to be more
pronounced in industries with a higher relationship-specificity. To develop the intuition behind this result,
it is important to understand first that a high relationship-specificity mitigates the negative effect of a higher
ownership share on the producer’s investment incentives. In industries with a high degree of relationship-
specificity, where inputs have little value on the outside market, the producer’s potential outside option is
small and of little importance for his ex-post payoff and ex-ante underinvestment. Hence, an increase in the
5Note that a PRT with partial contractibility and relationship-specificity has been considered before by Antràs (2015); our
novel framework combines these features with the explicit modeling of non-zero outside options for both parties and continuous
ownership shares, which are required to explain the above-mentioned empirical patterns.
6For clarity, we refer to the HQ as ‘she’ and the producer as ‘he’ throughout the paper.
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ownership share, reducing the producer’s outside option, has only a weak negative effect on his investment
incentives. Conversely, in industries with a low degree of relationship-specificity, the producer’s potential
outside option is large, and any increase in the ownership share strongly aggravates the underinvestment
problem. Hence, an improvement in contracting institutions allows the HQ to disproportionately increase
the optimal ownership share in industries with a high degree of relationship-specificity, where increased
ownership disincentivizes the producer’s investments less. To summarize, our PRT model predicts a pos-
itive direct effect of the quality of contracting institutions and a positive interaction effect of contracting
institutions and relationship-specificity on the optimal ownership share.
We test the model’s predictions using unique data on global ownership links from Orbis. This database
provides an extensive account of multinational firms’ ownership structures at an exceptional level of detail.
It reports the ownership shares of roughly 300,000 headquarters in more than half a million subsidiaries
worldwide. The dataset is uniquely suited for the purpose of our study because it combines three key
advantages: First, it includes firm-pair specific ownership data along with information on the countries,
industry affiliations, and other characteristics of both firms. Second, it covers headquarters and subsidiaries
in more than one hundred countries around the globe. And third, it includes both domestic and international
ownership links as well as multiple ownership links for some firms. These features allow us to provide
a large-scale investigation of the relationship between firm boundaries and contracting institutions, while
thoroughly controlling for heterogeneity across countries, industries, and firms on both sides of the own-
ership link.7 We enrich the database with various country-level proxies for contracting institutions and
industry-level measures of relationship-specificity to test the theoretical predictions.
Our empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we scrutinize the correlation between
the quality of contracting institutions and firm boundaries illustrated in Figure 1(a). To this end, we regress
firm-pair specific ownership shares on the rule of law index, while controlling for a large set of observable
characteristics (of the subsidiary’s country, the ownership structure, and bilateral investment costs) and a
battery of fixed effects (for the subsidiary’s industry as well as the HQ’s country-industry). Conditional on
all of these covariates, we find that firms own significantly higher shares of their subsidiaries in countries
with better judicial quality. This finding supports our first theoretical prediction.
In the second step, we move towards a more stringent test of the theory by regressing ownership shares
on an interaction term between the quality of contracting institutions in the subsidiary’s country and the
relationship-specificity of its industry (scrutinizing the pattern from Figure 1(b)). This approach allows us to
effectively account for all observable or unobservable characteristics of the subsidiary’s country using fixed
effects, thereby addressing first-order concerns related to omitted variables (such as cultural traits or other
institutions). In our preferred specification, we further control for bilateral investment costs by country-pair
fixed effects. The estimates yield a positive interaction effect of country-level judicial quality and industry-
level relationship-specificity on the depth of integration, which is both statistically and economically sig-
nificant. This finding supports the second key prediction of our model: The positive effect of contracting
7The only alternative dataset covering multinational firms in many countries is by Dun & Bradstreet. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this database documents neither ownership intensities nor multiple ownership links per firm.
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institutions on the ownership share is more pronounced in industries with a higher relationship-specificity.
Our main findings are robust to addressing several challenges to identification. We find very similar re-
sults using various alternative proxies for contracting institutions and approximating relationship-specificity
by a firm-pair specific measure based on the duration of a relationship. In an important set of robustness
checks, we accommodate remaining concerns regarding omitted variables. To this end, we allow for the
effects of economic development and other institutions on firm boundaries to differ arbitrarily across in-
dustries by including interaction terms of these country characteristics with subsidiary industry dummies
(following Levchenko, 2007). We further ensure that our results are not driven by firm heterogeneity among
subsidiaries or headquarters. Moreover, the effect of contracting institutions can even be identified from
within-firm variation across different ownership links of the same HQ. To address the possibility that selec-
tion into production countries may be driven by factors correlated with contracting institutions, we estimate
a two-stage model and correct for this type of selection following Heckman (1979). Allowing for non-
linearities in ownership decisions in an ordered logistic regression framework provides additional support
for our theoretical predictions. Finally, we exploit the historic origins of countries’ legal systems as an
exogenous source of variation in contracting institutions using instrumental variables and propensity score
matching techniques (as in Nunn, 2007). The robustness of our findings to all of these checks lends strong
support to the PRT.
Our paper is closely related to the work by Antràs (2015), who investigates the role of contracting institu-
tions for firms’ integration decisions both theoretically and empirically. Similar to our analysis, he contrasts
the effects of contracting institutions governing the producer’s investments on the relative attractiveness of
vertical integration in the TCT and the PRT. Yet, our theoretical contributions differ in two respects. First,
we model the integration decision as a continuous (rather than a binary) variable.8 Second, and most im-
portantly, we derive a clear testable prediction of the PRT regarding the interaction effect of contracting
institutions and relationship-specificity on firm boundaries. Our empirical approach is also substantially dif-
ferent. While Antràs (2015) approximates the relative attractiveness of foreign integration vs. outsourcing
using industry-level data on U.S. intra-firm imports, we test our predictions using a global dataset of own-
ership shares at the level of firm pairs.9 Although the author considers the interaction between a country’s
contracting institutions and an industry’s relationship-specificity in their impact on U.S. intra-firm trade, the
evidence remains inconclusive. By contrast, our micro data yield strong evidence for the positive interaction
8In so doing, we relate to Antràs and Helpman (2008), who show that the HQ’s optimal share of ex-post surplus increases in the
contractibility of a supplier’s inputs according to the PRT. However, the authors treat this share as a hypothetical construct, which
cannot be freely chosen by the HQ. We complement their findings by allowing the HQ to choose from a continuum of ownership
shares and show how the integration decision depends on contracting institutions and relationship-specificity. Previous theoretical
contributions have studied partially integrated production processes across multiple producers, either organized sequentially along
the value chain (Antràs and Chor, 2013; Alfaro et al., 2015) or simultaneously contributing to a single production stage (Schwarz
and Suedekum, 2014). However, none of these papers considers partial integration of a single firm.
9The U.S. intra-firm trade data has become a workhorse tool in empirical studies of international integration decisions (see
Yeaple, 2006; Nunn and Trefler, 2008, 2013; Antràs and Chor, 2013). Corcos et al. (2013) have taken this approach to the firm
level using French customs data. In line with the PRT, they find a positive correlation between contract enforcement in the foreign
country and the share of intra-firm imports. Other studies on intra-firm trade using firm-level data from a single country include
Carluccio and Fally (2012), Defever and Toubal (2013), Kohler and Smolka (2014, 2015), and Tomiura (2007), all of which find
patterns consistent with the PRT.
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effect of contracting institutions and relationship-specificity on the depth of integration.
To the best of our knowledge, Acemoglu et al. (2009) is the only existing firm-level study of the link
between contracting institutions and vertical integration in a large cross-section of countries. The authors
combine data on primary and secondary activities within a given firm with U.S. industry-level input-output
(I-O) tables to construct a vertical integration index, designed to approximate the firm’s propensity to own
a vertically integrated supplier.10 The authors do not find a significant relationship between this index and a
country’s contracting costs, but they document a higher degree of vertical integration in countries that have
both higher contracting costs and greater financial development. A key advantage of our data is that we
observe ownership intensities across firm pairs, which allows us to identify the effect of subsidiary country
institutions while controlling for the potentially confounding role of HQ country institutions using fixed
effects. In contrast to Acemoglu et al. (2009), our approach uncovers a robust positive link between the
quality of contracting institutions in a subsidiary’s country and the integration intensity.
Our theoretical and empirical results further contribute to the literature that aims to discriminate be-
tween the two prominent theories of the firm: TCT vs. PRT. The fact that the predictions of the TCT differ
in important ways from those of the PRT is generally known among economists (see Whinston, 2001, 2003;
Gibbons, 2005). A substantial body of empirical research has assessed various predictions of the two theo-
ries using data from a single firm, industry, or country.11 Yet, we are unaware of any empirical investigation
attempting to contrast these differential predictions using micro data from multiple countries. We suggest
a twofold explanation for the scarcity of empirical evidence on this fundamental question. First, theories
of the firm have mostly concentrated on the two ‘extreme’ cases of full integration and arm’s-length con-
tracting. Thus, the fact that commercial transactions between independent firms are rarely observed in the
data poses a major challenge for testing these theories. We make progress in this discourse by deriving pre-
dictions regarding the intensity of integration and test them using data on firm ownership shares. Second,
theoretical predictions are often formulated in terms of abstract concepts (e.g. marginal returns on invest-
ments or quasi-rents; see Whinston, 2003), which are extremely difficult to capture empirically. The key
explanatory variables in our analysis are contracting institutions and relationship-specificity, for which we
can obtain well-established proxies from readily available data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a PRTmodel of the firm and derives
our key predictions regarding optimal ownership shares. Section 3 describes our empirical approach and the
data. Section 4 presents our estimation results and a multitude of robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
10This approach has subsequently been used by Alfaro and Charlton (2009) and Alfaro et al. (2015) to characterize the organiza-
tion of multinational production activities. Recent evidence on US firms with multiple domestic plants (Atalay et al., 2014) or with
multinational affiliates (Ramondo et al., 2016) suggests that integrated firm pairs do not necessarily engage in intra-firm trade even
if they are vertically linked via I-O tables. Note that we do not rely on I-O tables to identify vertical links in this paper. Also, our
theoretical explanation of the integration decision is not restricted to vertical links, nor does it presuppose any intra-firm trade, as
producers in the model may sell their output to final consumers.
11For instance, Masten (1984) studies procurement decisions of a large aerospace company, Baker and Hubbard (2003, 2004)
examine ownership shares in the U.S. truck industry, Feenstra and Hanson (2005) consider the ownership structure of processing
trade in China, and Acemoglu et al. (2010) investigate technological determinants of vertical integration in the UK. See also
Whinston (2003) and Klein (2015) for reviews of other empirical studies.
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2 THEORETICAL MODEL
2.1 SET-UP
Consider a simple game between a firm’s headquarters (H) and a (manufacturing) producer (M ). Since the
latter may eventually be owned to some degree by the former, we frequently refer to M as the subsidiary.
The two parties can be located in the same or in different countries. Each firm is run by one owner-manager.
The HQ possesses the idea (a blueprint) for the production of a differentiated final good, and the producer
has the capacity to implement this idea. Without loss of generality, we normalize both parties’ ex-ante
outside options to zero.12 Assuming constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences over varieties of a
differentiated final good implies the following iso-elastic demand for a single variety:
x = Dp 1/(1 ↵), 0 < ↵ < 1,
whereby x and p denote quantity and price, respectively, D > 0 is a demand shifter, and ↵ is a parameter
related to the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties,   = 1/(1   ↵). This demand function
yields the following revenue:
R = x↵D1 ↵. (1)
Final goods are produced byM with a continuum of (manufacturing) inputsm(i), indexed by points on
the unit interval, i 2 [0, 1]. One unit ofm(i) is produced with one unit of labor. Without loss of generality,
we normalize the unit production costs ofm(i) to one. M combines these inputs into final goods according
to the Cobb-Douglas production function:
x = exp
Z 1
0
lnm(i)di
 
. (2)
Throughout the analysis, we assume that M is indispensable for the production of x, in the sense that H
cannot manufacture final goods withoutM .13
Firms operate in an environment of contractual incompleteness, i.e., courts cannot fully verify and en-
force all of the subsidiary’s investments into intermediate inputs. To formalize this idea, we adopt the notion
of partial contractibility from Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Antràs and Helpman (2008). More specifically,
we assume that investments into inputs in the range [0, µ], with 0  µ  1, can be stipulated in an enforce-
able ex-ante contract, while investments into the remaining inputs cannot be verified by the courts and are
therefore non-contractible. Following these authors, we interpret µ as the quality of contracting institutions
inM ’s country. The idea behind this notion of contracting institutions is that a more efficient judicial sys-
tem can enforce contracts over a wider range of product characteristics (see also Chapter 4 in Antràs, 2015).
Clearly, there might also be technological factors that affect the degree of contractibility µ. Our model-
12Throughout the paper, we use ‘ex-ante’ to describe the point in time before the relationship-specific investments are sunk and
‘ex-post’ to describe the period thereafter. As will become clear below, both parties may have non-zero outside options ex-post.
13This assumption can be justified by the fact that H lacks either the production capacity or the expertise required to assemble
the final goods (or both). This is the reason why the two parties need to form a relationship in the first place.
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ing of µ as a country-specific variable reflects the notion that, for any given production technology, better
contracting institutions are ceteris paribus more efficient at enforcing contracts. To consider an illustrative
example, only well-functioning courts are able to verify whether high-tech inputs, such as computer chips,
are produced according to the required standard. Hence, production of computer chips is contractible in
countries with high judicial quality, but non-contractible in countries with bad contracting institutions.
We assume that M ’s inputs are customized to H’s blueprint, and hence are (partially) relationship-
specific. More precisely, by selling an input on the outside market, one can recoup only a fraction (1 ⇢) of
the production costs, whereby ⇢ 2 [0, 1] measures the degree of relationship-specificity. For ⇢ = 0,M ’s in-
puts have the same value for an outside party as within the current relationship, whereas ⇢ = 1 represents the
case of fully relationship-specific inputs.14 In what follows, we treat ⇢ as an industry-specific variable, i.e.,
subsidiaries in industries with a high ⇢ produce highly relationship-specific inputs (see also Antràs, 2015).
Since some ofM ’s inputs are non-contractible ex-ante, H andM bargain over the surplus ex-post, i.e.,
after investments have been made. In anticipation of ex-post bargaining, H chooses ex-ante the optimal
ownership share s 2 [0, 1] in M . What are H’s costs and benefits of choosing a higher s? The answer
to this question crucially depends on the underlying theory of the firm. According to the Transaction-Cost
Theory (TCT), a higher ownership share translates into a higher ability of H to ‘dictate’ toM the amount
of non-contractible inputs, but it involves additional governance costs. The Property-Rights Theory (PRT)
challenges this view by arguing that, regardless of the ownership share, H cannot enforce non-contractible
inputs by fiat, and that the hold-up problem prevails even within firm boundaries. Instead, the PRT sees the
role of ownership in shapingH’s residual control rights, i.e., the authority to determine the use ofM ’s inputs
under circumstances that are not specified in a contract. As discussed in more detail below, the two theories
provide diametrically opposed predictions regarding the effect of contracting institutions on the equilibrium
ownership structure of the firm. We develop our main theoretical argument based on the PRT and provide a
short discussion of the alternative predictions of the TCT in Section 2.4.3.
Following the PRT approach, we assume that ex-post negotiations take the form of generalized Nash
bargaining. More precisely, each party obtains his or her outside option (i.e., the payoff in the absence of
trade) plus a fraction of the ex-post gains from trade (the so-called quasi-rent), defined as revenue minus
both parties’ outside options. Let   2 (0, 1) denote the share of the quasi-rent accruing to H (henceforth,
H’s bargaining power), while the remaining share (1    ) goes to M . If the bargaining breaks down,
intermediate inputs can be sold on the outside market. Each party’s outside option depends on the fraction
of inputs he or she possesses. The HQ has enforceable ownership rights over contractible inputs m(i),
i 2 [0, µ]. The extent to which each party has residual control rights over non-contractible inputs depends
onH’s ownership share inM . More specifically,H controls the fraction s of non-contractible inputs, while
M controls the remaining share (1  s) ofm(i), i 2 [µ, 1]. This ‘zero-sum’ notion of outside options builds
on the idea of residual control rights by Grossman and Hart (1986), who argue that, “if one party gets rights
14Our modeling of relationship-specificity presupposes the existence of a perfectly competitive outside market. The assumption
that M ’s inputs have a lower value for a tertiary party (as compared to the current relationship) reflects the idea that an outside
buyer would have to incur additional costs to customize these inputs to her production process. This reduced-form approach can be
rationalized by a richer model of the outside market along the lines of Grossman and Helpman (2001, 2002).
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of control, then this diminishes the rights of the other party to have control” (p. 693).15
The timing of events is as follows. In t1, H chooses the ownership share s inM .16 In t2, H stipulates
the amount of contractible inputs to be produced byM and commits to compensating him for the associated
production costs. In t3, M invests into non-contractible inputs and provides the amount of contractible
inputs stipulated in the ex-ante contract. In t4, the parties bargain over the surplus from the relationship.
In t5, final goods are produced and sold, and the revenue is distributed among the parties according to the
agreements reached in t2 and t4. In the following section, we solve this game by backward induction.
2.2 EQUILIBRIUM
Before characterizing the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game outlined above, it is instructive to con-
sider first the hypothetical case of complete contracts. If courts could perfectly verify and enforce in-
vestments into all intermediate inputs, the parties would stipulate the amount of m(i), i 2 [0, 1], which
maximizes the joint surplus:
max
{m(i)}1i=0
⇡ = R 
Z 1
0
m(i)di.
Solving this maximization problem using equations (1) and (2) yields the first-best (FB) amount of inputs:
m(i) = ↵R ⌘ mFB 8i 2 [0, 1], (3)
whereby R = D↵
↵
1 ↵ is obtained from plugging equations (2) and (3) into equation (1) and solving the
resulting expression for R.
Consider now the relevant case of contractual incompleteness, introduced in Section 2.1. In t4, each
party obtains his or her outside option plus a fraction of the quasi-rent (Q), defined as follows:
Q = R  (1  ⇢)(1  s)
Z 1
µ
m(i)di 

(1  ⇢)s
Z 1
µ
m(i)di+ (1  ⇢)
Z µ
0
m(i)di
 
, (4)
whereby R is given by equation (1). The second term on the right-hand side representsM ’s outside option,
which is equal to the outside value (1  ⇢) of the fraction (1  s) of non-contractible inputsm(i), i 2 [µ, 1].
The term in the square brackets denotes H’s outside option and consists of the outside value of the fraction
s of non-contractible inputs, as well as the outside value of contractible inputsm(i), i 2 [0, µ].
In t3, M anticipates the outcome of Nash bargaining from period t4 and chooses the amount of non-
contractible inputs which maximizes her payoff from the ex-post negotiations net of production costs of
these inputs:17
max
{m(i)}1i=µ
⇡M = (1  ⇢)(1  s)
Z 1
µ
m(i)di+ (1   )Q 
Z 1
µ
m(i)di. (5)
15The reader familiar with Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008) will notice two differences in our modeling of outside options
compared to their approach. First, while M ’s outside option in Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008) is set to zero regardless of the
ownership structure, it is equal to zero in our framework only under full integration (i.e., s = 1). Second, if the bargaining breaks
down,H in the current framework cannot produce final goods on her own (cf. also footnote 13).
16Following Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), we do not assume a direct cost of acquisition of (a larger
share of)M . Our results remain qualitatively unchanged if we introduce a fixed cost of integration into the model.
17Note that contractible inputs do not enter M ’s maximization problem, since they are chosen by H in t2, and M is fully
compensated for the associated production costs.
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Using equations (1), (2), and (4), the solution to this maximization problem yields the optimal amount of
non-contractible (n) inputs:
m(i) =  ↵R ⌘ mn 8i 2 [µ, 1], (6)
as a function of revenue, obtained from plugging equations (2) and (6) into equation (1):
R =
✓
exp
Z µ
0
lnm(i)di
 ↵
( ↵)↵(1 µ)D1 ↵
◆ 1
1 ↵(1 µ)
, (7)
whereby
  ⌘ 1   
1    + s(1  ⇢) + ⇢  . (8)
Since 0 <    1 for all   2 (0, 1) and ⇢, s 2 [0, 1], it can be seen immediately from the comparison of
equations (3) and (6) that mn  mFB for any given level of R. Intuitively,M anticipates ex-post hold-up
with respect to non-contractible inputs and underinvests into these inputs compared to the first-best level.
The magnitude ofM ’s underinvestments into non-contractible inputs (the size ofmn) depends crucially
on the ownership share and the degree of relationship-specificity. Since these dependencies are key to
understanding the main predictions derived in the next section, we formulate:
Lemma 1. For any given level of revenue, the subsidiary’s investments into non-contractible inputs (i)
decrease in the ownership share, and (ii) this negative effect is mitigated by a higher relationship-specificity.
Proof. For part (i), note that @mn@s
  
R
< 0 is implied by @ @s < 0 from equation (8). For part (ii), the
cross partial-derivative of mn with respect to s and ⇢ is @
2mn
@s@⇢
  
R
= 1 (1 ⇢)(s  )
[1+(1 ⇢)(s  )]3↵(1    )R. Since
(s    ) 2 ( 1, 1) for all s 2 [0, 1] and   2 (0, 1), we immediately have @2mn@s@⇢
  
R
> 0 for all ↵ 2 (0, 1),
⇢ 2 [0, 1], and R > 0.
The intuition behind the first part of Lemma 1 derives from the fact that an increase in s ceteris paribus
decreasesM ’s outside option, and thereby worsens his ex-post bargaining position. IfM expects to receive
a smaller payoff ex-post, his ex-ante incentives to invest into mn decrease. To understand the second part
of Lemma 1, consider two different industries, one with a very high relationship-specificity (⇢ approaching
one) and one with a low relationship-specificity (⇢ close to zero). In the highly relationship-specific industry,
M ’s investments have only a small value on the outside market. Hence, a change in the ownership share s
has little effect onM ’s outside option and on his payoff (see equation (5)). In other words, if the relationship-
specificity is high,H can increase the ownership share without reducingM ’s investment incentives too much
at the margin. By contrast, in an industry with a low degree of relationship-specificity, there is potentially
much to gain forM on the outside market. Thus, any change in the ownership share affecting this relatively
large outside option has a substantial impact onM ’s payoff. As a result, an increase in the ownership share
strongly aggravates the underinvestment problem if the relationship-specificity is low. Generalizing this
argument for all values of ⇢, we conclude that a higher relationship-specificity mitigates the negative effect
of an increased ownership share on the subsidiary’s investment incentives.
Consider nowH’s optimization problem. In t2, the HQ stipulates the amount of contractible inputs that
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maximizes her payoff from Nash bargaining net of the compensation for these inputs:
max
{m(i)}µi=0
⇡H = (1  ⇢)s(1  µ)mn + (1  ⇢)
Z µ
0
m(i)di+  Q 
Z µ
0
m(i)di, (9)
subject toM ’s participation constraint (PC), obtained from plugging equation (6) into equation (5):
⇡M = (1   )Q  (1  µ) [1  (1  ⇢)(1  s)]mn   0, (10)
whereby Q and mn are given by equations (4) and (6), respectively.18 In our baseline analysis, we assume
thatM ’s PC is fulfilled and non-binding (i.e., ⇡M > 0), and solve the unconstrained maximization problem
from equation (9). There are two reasons for this approach. First, it allows us to illustrate the HQ’s key
trade-off in the simplest possible manner. Second, we show in Appendix A.1 that M ’s PC is slack for
the vast majority of relevant parameter values. Intuitively, the need to incentivize M typically implies a
more stringent upper bound on the optimal ownership share than the PC would. Nevertheless, we verify
in Section 2.4.1 that our key predictions are qualitatively unchanged if the PC is binding and H solves the
optimization problem from equation (9) with equation (10) as an equality constraint.
Using equations (4), (6), (7), and (8) in equation (9), and solving H’s maximization problem for the
optimal number of contractible (c) inputs, we obtain:
m(i) = !↵R ⌘ mc 8i 2 [0, µ], (11)
as a function of revenue, obtained from inserting equation (11) into equation (7):
R =  
↵(1 µ)
1 ↵ !
↵µ
1 ↵↵
↵
1 ↵D, (12)
whereby
! ⌘ s↵(1  ⇢)(1  µ)   
2(1  ⇢) [1  ↵(1  µ)] +   [1 + s(1  ⇢)  ↵(1 + s)(1  µ)(1  ⇢)]
[1  ↵(1  µ)] [⇢+  (1  ⇢)] [1    + s(1  ⇢) + ⇢ ] . (13)
In t1, H chooses the optimal ownership share by solving the following maximization problem:
max
s
⇡H = (1  ⇢)s(1  µ) ↵R  ⇢µ!↵R+  [R  (1  ⇢)(1  µ) ↵R  (1  ⇢)µ!↵R], (14)
keeping in mindM ’s PC from equation (10). Plugging equations (8), (12), and (13) into equation (14), we
obtain from the first-order condition the optimal ownership share:
s⇤(µ, ⇢) =
1 +  2(1  ⇢)  2    ↵(1   )(1  µ)[1   (1  ⇢)]
(1  ⇢)[  + ↵(1   )(1  µ)] . (15)
Plugging this ownership share as well as equations (8), (12), and (13) into equation (14), it can be shown
that H’s maximum profits from the relationship are positive for all admissible parameter values.
18The HQ also accounts forM ’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), which ensures thatM utilizes non-contractible inputs
(1   s)(1   µ)mn within the current relationship rather than selling them on the outside market. Formally, the ICC is fulfilled
wheneverM ’s payoff fromNash bargaining is not smaller than his ex-post outside option, i.e., (1 ⇢)(1 s)(1 µ)mn+(1  )Q  
(1  ⇢)(1  s)(1 µ)mn. Notice thatQ   0 is a sufficient condition forM ’s ICC to hold. Since this condition is implied byM ’s
PC from equation (10), the ICC may be ignored whenever the PC is fulfilled.
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2.3 COMPARATIVE STATICS AND TESTABLE PREDICTIONS
In this section, we use comparative statics analysis to derive testable predictions regarding the effect of
contracting institutions on the optimal ownership share. The relationship between s⇤ and µ is summarized in
Proposition 1. The optimal ownership share increases in the quality of contracting institutions.
Proof. @s
⇤
@µ =
↵(1  )2
(1 ⇢)[ +↵(1  )(1 µ)]2 > 0 8 ↵,  2 (0, 1), µ 2 [0, 1], ⇢ 2 [0, 1).
To understand the intuition behind this result, consider the trade-off faced by H when choosing s⇤. On the
one hand, a higher ownership share increases the HQ’s outside option, and thereby raises H’s profits speci-
fied in equation (9). On the other hand, a higher s⇤ reducesM ’s payoff (see equation (5)) and aggravates the
ex-post hold-up from the viewpoint of M . This worsens M ’s ex-ante underinvestment in non-contractible
inputs (see the first part of Lemma 1), and reduces the revenue from equation (7). Simply put, by choosing
a higher ownership share in the subsidiary, the HQ trades off a larger fraction of surplus against a larger sur-
plus size. When contracting institutions improve, the range of non-contractible inputs shrinks. This reduces
the need for incentivizing M by giving him residual control rights. Hence, H optimally retains a larger
share of the surplus for herself by choosing a higher ownership share s⇤.
Figure 2(a) illustrates the positive relationship between s⇤ and µ derived in Proposition 1.19 In an envi-
ronment of poor contracting institutions, where µ is below some threshold µ, the HQ optimally chooses an
ownership share of zero in order to provide maximal incentives for M . For µ 2 (µ, µ), the optimal own-
ership share increases monotonically in µ, reflecting the fact that better contracting institutions can enforce
contracts on a wider range of inputs, and thereby substitute for the need to incentivizeM ’s investment. For
very high institutional quality, above the threshold µ, the HQ maximizes her share of the surplus by choos-
ing full ownership. It should be noted that, for some parameter combinations, µ may lie below zero and µ
may exceed one. If µ < 0 and µ > 1, the optimal ownership share s⇤ lies strictly within the unit interval
and it is strictly increasing in the quality of contracting institutions for all values of µ.
Consider next the interaction effect between µ and ⇢ in their impact on s⇤, which is summarized in
Proposition 2. The positive effect of contracting institutions on the optimal ownership share is stronger in
industries with a higher degree of relationship-specificity.
Proof. @
2s⇤
@µ@⇢ =
↵(1  )2
(1 ⇢)2[ +↵(1  )(1 µ)]2 > 0 8 ↵,  2 (0, 1), µ 2 [0, 1], ⇢ 2 [0, 1).
The intuition behind this key result builds on the insights from Proposition 1 and Lemma 1: According
to Proposition 1, the optimal ownership share is monotonically increasing in the quality of contracting
institutions. Also, Lemma 1 shows that the negative effect of a higher ownership share onM ’s investments
into non-contractible inputs is mitigated in highly relationship-specific industries. Hence, if contracting
institutions improve, H increases the optimal ownership share more strongly in industries with a higher
degree of relationship-specificity, where the adverse effect of a higher s⇤ onM ’s investments is less severe.
19As depicted in the figure, the second-order derivative of s⇤ with respect to µ is positive: @
2s⇤
@µ2
= 2↵
2(1  )3
(1 ⇢)[ +↵(1  )(1 µ)]3 > 0.
The threshold values µ =  [2 ↵(2 ⇢)]  
2(1 ↵)(1 ⇢)+↵ 1
↵(1  )[1  (1 ⇢)] and µ =
 [3(1 ↵) ⇢(1 2↵)]  2(1 ↵)(1 ⇢)+↵(2 ⇢) 1
↵(1  )[2 ⇢  (1 ⇢)] can easily be
derived from s⇤(µ) = 0 and s⇤(µ) = 1, respectively.
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FIGURE 2: Optimal ownership share s⇤
(a) Direct effect of µ (b) Interaction between µ and ⇢
Figure 2(b) illustrates the interaction effect between contracting institutions µ and relationship-specificity
⇢. It plots the optimal ownership share s⇤ as a function of µ for a low value of ⇢ (solid line) and for a high
value of ⇢ (dashed line). Reflecting Proposition 2, the line is steeper for the highly relationship-specific
industry at all levels of µ. The more specificM ’s investments, the less does an increase in the optimal own-
ership share disincentivize these investments. Hence, H can exploit an improvement in institutional quality
by increasing her ownership share more strongly in the highly relationship-specific industry.
Note that, while the effect of ⇢ on the slope of s⇤(µ) is clear-cut, its effect on the level of s⇤ is a pri-
ori ambiguous. In the case depicted in Figure 2(b), the dashed line lies strictly below the continuous line.
However, for alternative parameter combinations, it may lie strictly above this line or intersect it once in
the unit interval.20 This ambiguity is explained by the interplay of two opposing effects: On the one hand,
an increase in relationship-specificity ⇢ decreasesM ’s outside option and reduces his ex-ante investments.
On the other hand, a rise in ⇢ increases the surplus thatM can obtain within the relationship (the quasi-rent
from equation (4)), which improves his investment incentives. The relative magnitude of these opposing
effects depends onM ’s bargaining power (1   ).21 In particular, ifM ’s bargaining power is relatively low
(the case depicted in the figure), he puts a high weight on his outside option compared to the quasi-rent. As
a result, the net effect of an increase in relationship-specificity is that it provides disincentives, which must
be compensated by a lower ownership share. In the alternative case, if M has a relatively high bargaining
power, the positive effect of an increase in relationship-specificity on the quasi-rent dominates, which incen-
tivizesM ’s ex-ante investments and allows H to retain a higher ownership share. Importantly, the positive
interaction effect of µ and ⇢ on s⇤ predicted by Proposition 2 holds regardless of which case prevails.
20Evaluating @s
⇤
@⇢ at the lower (µ) and upper (µ) threshold values of µ reported in footnote 19 yields
@s⇤
@⇢ |µ=µ =    1 ⇢ < 0 and
@s⇤
@⇢ |µ=µ = 1  1 ⇢ > 0. Bearing in mind Proposition 1, there is a unique threshold µˆ such that the dashed line is underneath the solid
line for µ < µˆ, and it lies above the solid line for µ   µˆ. Solving @s⇤@⇢ = 0 for µ yields the cutoff µˆ = ↵(1  )+2  1↵(1  ) . Since µˆ is
not restricted to the unit interval, the dashed line may cross the solid line at µ < 0, µ > 1, or µ 2 [0, 1].
21Formally,mn from equation (6) increases in ⇢ if and only if   < s, and it decreases in ⇢ if this inequality if reversed.
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2.4 EXTENSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Before turning to an empirical test of Propositions 1 and 2, it is worth pausing to discuss their generality. In
Section 2.4.1, we show that our main predictions continue to hold ifM ’s participation constraint is binding,
whereas considering ex-ante transfers would yield uninteresting results. In Section 2.4.2, we provide a gen-
eralization of the benchmark framework that incorporates joint production and allows us to relate our results
to the seminal contributions by Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004). Finally, Section 2.4.3 pro-
vides a brief discussion of the predictions by the Transaction-Cost Theory regarding the effect of contracting
institutions on firm boundaries, which are diametrically opposed to those of the PRT.
2.4.1 PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINT AND EX-ANTE TRANSFERS
Recall that our baseline results were derived under the assumption that M ’s PC from equation (10) is not
binding for any optimal ownership share given by equation (15). In Appendix A.1, we provide a sufficient
condition forM ’s PC to be non-binding and show that it is fulfilled for the vast majority of relevant param-
eter values. Nevertheless, we verify that our main theoretical results continue to hold also in those cases
for which M ’s PC is binding. A tedious but straightforward analysis of H’s maximization problems from
equations (9) and (14), subject toM ’s PC from equation (10), yields the optimal ownership share:
s⇤PC =
1      ↵(1  µ)[1   (1  ⇢)]
↵(1  ⇢)(1  µ) .
It can be verified that both the first-order derivative of this share with respect to µ as well as the cross-partial
derivative with respect to µ and ⇢ are positive for all ↵,  2 (0, 1), µ, ⇢ 2 [0, 1):
@s⇤PC
@µ
=
1   
↵(1  ⇢)(1  µ)2 > 0,
@2s⇤PC
@µ@⇢
=
1   
↵(1  ⇢)2(1  µ)2 > 0.
Hence, Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold in case of a binding PC.
Notice that our benchmark analysis does not allow for ex-ante lump sum transfers (side payments),
which are frequently assumed in the literature to ensure that the entire surplus from the relationship accrues
to one party (the HQ). As shown in Appendix A.2, allowing for these transfers in the present context would
result in an uninteresting case of zero optimal ownership shares, regardless of the quality of contracting
institutions. To understand the intuition behind this result, recall the key trade-off faced byH in our model:
By choosing a higher ownership share, H weighs a higher share of surplus against a larger surplus size.
If she can extract the entire surplus from M via ex-ante transfers, this trade-off vanishes and H’s only
objective is to maximize the surplus size. Since both M ’s investments in non-contractible inputs and the
overall revenue decrease in s (see equations (6) and (7)), H’s optimal ownership share in the presence of
ex-ante transfers is always equal to zero. To generate a non-trivial trade-off from the viewpoint of the HQ,
the baseline model does not allow for ex-ante transfers.
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2.4.2 HEADQUARTER INTENSITY
So far, we have assumed that all investments required for production are borne solely by M . One might
wonder whether our predictions extend to the case in which both parties invest into relationship-specific
and non-contractible inputs, resulting in a two-sided hold-up problem. To tackle this question, we introduce
an element of joint production by assuming the Cobb-Douglas production technology from Antràs and
Helpman (2004):
x =
✓
h
⌘
◆⌘ ✓ m
1  ⌘
◆(1 ⌘)
, (16)
whereby h represents headquarter services provided by H , and ⌘ 2 (0, 1) captures the relative importance
of headquarter services in the production process (henceforth, headquarter intensity or HI). Each unit of
h is produced with one unit of labor. Without loss of generality, we normalize H’s unit production costs
to one. As in the benchmark model, we assume that M produces a continuum of manufacturing inputs
m = exp
hR 1
0 lnm(i)di
i
, whereby only the fraction µ 2 [0, 1] of the inputs m(i) is contractible, while the
remaining fraction (1   µ) cannot be verified and enforced by the courts. As before, we also assume that
the parties can recoup a fraction (1   ⇢) of the production costs of manufacturing inputs on the outside
market, whereby ⇢ 2 [0, 1] captures the degree of relationship-specificity. To keep our model simple, we
assume that headquarter services h are fully non-contractible and entirely relationship-specific. The timing
of the game is identical to the one presented in the main text, apart from the period t3, in which H now
provides headquarter services, whileM simultaneously and non-cooperatively invests into non-contractible
manufacturing inputs and provides the amount of contractible manufacturing inputs stipulated in period t2.
This set-up implies a two-sided hold-up problem and ex-ante underinvestment by both parties. As shown in
Appendix A.3, solving the model yields the following optimal ownership share:
s⇤HI =
1 +  2(1  ⇢)⇥1  ↵[1  µ(1  ⌘)]⇤  2    ↵⇥1  µ(1  ⌘)   [2  ⇢(1  ⌘)  µ(2  ⇢)(1  ⌘)]⇤
(1  ⇢)
h
    ↵ ⇥  1  µ(1  ⌘)   (1  ⌘)(1  µ)⇤ i . (17)
Before discussing the effect of contracting institutions on the optimal ownership share, two remarks are
in order. First, since s⇤HI from equation (17) reduces to s⇤ from equation (15) for ⌘ = 0, the equilibrium
presented in this section generalizes the results of the one-sided hold-up game analyzed in Section 2.2.
Second, the optimal ownership share increases in the headquarter intensity ⌘ for all permissible values of
↵, , ⌘ 2 (0, 1), µ 2 [0, 1], and ⇢ 2 [0, 1):
@s⇤HI
@⌘
=
↵(1  ↵)(1  µ)(1   )2
(1  ⇢)
h
    ↵ ⇥  1  µ(1  ⌘)   (1  ⌘)(1  µ)⇤ i2 > 0.
This result squares well with the findings by Antràs and Helpman (2004) and the general logic of the PRT:
As the headquarter intensity increases (i.e., manufacturing inputs become relatively less important in the
production process), the need for incentivizing M decreases and the relative attractiveness of integration
increases. Given that firm boundaries in the current framework constitute a continuous choice variable, our
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results complement the previous literature that has modeled firm boundaries as a binary decision between
integration and arm’s-length contracting.
Consider now the effect of contracting institutions on the optimal ownership share. Both the first-order
derivative of s⇤HI with respect to µ, as well as the cross-partial derivative of s⇤HI with respect to µ and ⇢ are
positive for all permissible parameter values:
@s⇤HI
@µ
=
↵(1  ↵⌘)(1  ⌘)(1   )2
(1  ⇢)
h
    ↵ ⇥  1  µ(1  ⌘)   (1  ⌘)(1  µ)⇤ i2 > 0,
@2s⇤HI
@µ@⇢
=
1
(1  ⇢)
@s⇤HI
@µ
> 0.
Hence, Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold in the extended model in which both parties invest into
relationship-specific and non-contractible inputs.22
2.4.3 TRANSACTION-COST THEORY AND OTHER THEORIES OF THE FIRM
How do contracting institutions affect firm boundaries under the alternative assumptions of the TCT? And
how does this effect depend on the relationship-specificity of the subsidiary’s industry? Since these ques-
tions have been treated theoretically by Antràs (2015), we abstain from developing the TCT model in this
paper, but rather provide a brief discussion of his results. According to the TCT, contracting institutions
and relationship-specificity play no role under integration because the HQ can enforce the integrated pro-
ducer’s ex-ante investments by fiat (at the expense of exogenous governance costs). Yet, under arm’s-length
contracting, an improvement of contracting institutions increases the HQ’s profits, in particular in indus-
tries with higher degrees of relationship-specificity.23 Intuitively, a higher quality of contracting institutions
mitigates the ex-post hold-up that plagues commercial transactions between independent parties and alle-
viates the ex-ante underinvestment into relationship-specific inputs. This effect is particularly pronounced
in industries with high degrees of relationship-specificity since the hold-up problem in those industries is
relatively more severe. As a result, the relative attractiveness of integration vs. arm’s-length contracting
under the TCT decreases in the quality of contracting institutions, and it decreases more strongly in highly
relationship-specific industries (see equation (8.8) in Antràs, 2015). Notice that these TCT-based predictions
point in the opposite direction compared to those suggested by the PRT, i.e., Propositions 1 and 2.24 Since
the TCT delivers the alternative hypotheses to the null hypotheses from the PRT, testing our theoretical
predictions empirically allows us to discriminate between these two alternative theories of the firm.
22We have also explored the interaction effect @
2s⇤HI
@µ@⌘ , but the sign of this cross-partial derivative turns out to be ambiguous.
23These results are reported in equation (5.14) in Antràs (2015) and are formally derived in his Appendix 2.
24Although the TCT predictions in Antràs (2015) are derived for a binary (rather than a continuous) integration decision, one can
easily envision a simple extension of his model in which the HQ’s profits are a convex combination of profits under integration (I)
and arm’s-length contracting (A), ⇡ = s⇤⇡I + (1   s⇤)⇡A, whereby the optimal ownership share s⇤ 2 [0, 1] governs the weight
of ⇡I vs. ⇡A in the HQ’s profit function. Hence, when ⇡A increases due to an improvement in contracting institutions, the HQ has
an incentive to reduce s⇤ in order to reap a higher ⇡.
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3 EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
3.1 ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATIONS
The point of departure for our econometric specifications is the optimal ownership share predicted by our
model in equation (15). To concentrate on the effect of contracting institutions and their interaction with
relationship-specificity, we specify econometric models that are linear in parameters, while relying on large
sets of fixed effects to control for the other determinants of ownership shares from the theoretical model.
We implement our empirical tests of Propositions 1 and 2 in two steps.
As a first step, we investigate Proposition 1 by estimating the following econometric model:
Shm =   · C` +' ·Xhm + "hm, (18)
where Shm denotes the share in subsidiary m (active in industry i and country `) that is owned by head-
quarters h (which may be active either in the same or in a different industry and country, respectively).
The explanatory variable of primary interest is the quality of contracting institutions C` in the subsidiary’s
country `, and   is the key parameter to be estimated. The vector Xhm contains sets of control variables
(with associated coefficient vector '), which vary by specification, and "hm is an error term. In our pre-
ferred specification, Xhm includes observable characteristics of the subsidiary’s country, of the ownership
structure, and proxies for bilateral investment costs specific to the country pair, as well as full sets of fixed
effects (FE) for the subsidiary’s industry and the HQ’s country-industry. These FE play an important role
in absorbing other determinants of Shm according to our theory: the demand elasticity (reflected in ↵),
relationship-specificity (⇢), and headquarter intensity (⌘), to the extent that these variables are industry-
specific; as well as the country-industry-specific component of the HQ’s bargaining power ( ). The specific
list of all variables, their measurement, and the data sources are detailed in Section 3.2.
As shown in Proposition 1, based on the PRT we expect a positive effect of the quality of contracting in-
stitutions on the ownership share, reflected in   > 0. That is, for subsidiaries located in countries with better
contracting institutions, we should observe ceteris paribus higher degrees of integration. Intuitively, firms in
such countries can write enforceable contracts on a larger share of the subsidiary’s inputs, and hence, there is
less need to incentivize a subsidiary’s ex-ante investments by giving him residual control rights.25 However,
we caution against interpreting the estimated coefficient as a causal effect of contracting institutions. While
we control for various confounding factors, there remains a concern regarding omitted variables specific to
the subsidiary’s country, such as cultural characteristics or other features of the institutional environment,
that may be correlated with C` and also affect Shm. Hence, we interpret our estimates  ˆ as conditional
correlations.
We make progress towards identifying the causal effect of contracting institutions on firm boundaries by
estimating the differential effect of contracting institutions across industries that differ in their relationship-
25A negative estimate of   would lend support to the alternative hypothesis suggested by the TCT (see Section 2.4.3).
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specificity. To test this interaction effect, we set up the econometric model:
Shm =  1 · (C` ⇥Ri) +  2 · C` +  3 ·Ri +   ·Yhm + ehm, (19)
where we are mainly interested in the interaction term of contracting institutions C` in the subsidiary’s
country ` and the relationship-specificity Ri of the subsidiary’s industry i. This approach allows us to
address the concern regarding omitted variables by including subsidiary country FE in the vector of control
variablesYhm, in addition to all of the elements ofXhm from equation (18). In our preferred specification of
equation (19), we further control for country-pair FE to absorb all unobserved features of bilateral investment
costs. The parameters to be estimated are  j , j 2{1, 2, 3}, and the vector  , and ehm denotes the error term.
As derived formally in Proposition 2, the PRT predicts a positive interaction effect, i.e.,  1 > 0. In-
tuitively, a higher relationship-specificity mitigates the negative effect of the ownership share on the sub-
sidiary’s investments, and therefore allows the HQ to increase her ownership share more strongly in response
to better contracting institutions. Thus, cross-country differences in institutional quality should have a
stronger positive effect on the ownership share in industries with a higher degree of relationship-specificity.26
By exploiting the interaction between country-level institutions and industry-level technological charac-
teristics, equation (19) resembles a difference-in-differences model, where we control for the respective first
differences with country and industry FE. It is reminiscent of the econometric models traditionally used to
assess the effect of institutions on international trade patterns, as discussed by Nunn and Trefler (2014).27
However, there are two crucial differences between our model and this approach. First, by looking at own-
ership shares, we examine the intensity of investment links instead of trade flows. Second, our micro data
analysis exploits variation across different subsidiary countries and industries within a given HQ’s country-
industry cell (and even within HQ in some robustness checks), in contrast to the analysis of comparative
advantage, which is typically conducted at the aggregate level of industries and countries.28
We estimate both models by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) due to the well-known complications that
arise in non-linear models when interpreting interaction terms (see Ai and Norton, 2003), as in the case of
our main variable of interest.29 We compute two-way cluster-robust standard errors following the procedure
suggested by Cameron et al. (2011).30 First, we cluster at the level of the key explanatory variable, i.e., the
level of the subsidiary’s country in equation (18) and the subsidiary’s country-industry level in equation (19).
Second, we cluster at the level of the HQ in all OLS estimations to account for interdependencies across a
given HQ’s ownership decisions.
Before turning to the description of the data sources, three comments on the empirical implementation
of our model are in order. First, while the key mechanism of the PRT is well understood in organizational
26Note that the TCT yields the opposite prediction for the sign of the interaction effect (see Section 2.4.3).
27Acemoglu et al. (2007), Costinot (2009), Levchenko (2007), and Nunn (2007) show that contracting institutions can constitute
a source of comparative advantage in international trade.
28Ma et al. (2010) and Wang et al. (2014) are recent exceptions analyzing the role of institutions for firm-level exports.
29In a robustness check, we allow for non-linearities using an ordered logistic regression model (see Section 4.3.5).
30Estimations are implemented using the Stata routine reghdfe provided by Correia (2014), which efficiently absorbs our
high-dimensional FE and allows for both multi-way clustering of standard errors as well as the use of instrumental variables.
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economics, it has typically been applied to discrete ownership choices between integration and arm’s-length
contracting. A novelty of our approach lies in considering varying intensities of integration across firm
pairs. However, one may be skeptical of whether marginal changes in owners’ equity shares can indeed
have significant effects on the incentives of the subsidiary’s manager. Direct evidence for the relevance of
this mechanism is provided for instance by Baker and Gompers (1999) using data on the equity shares held
by CEOs in newly public firms. The authors show that reductions in the CEO’s equity share due to the par-
ticipation of venture capitalists or due to an initial public offering significantly reduce the CEO’s incentives.
Second, and related, our theoretical model assumes that both parties’ residual control rights change in
response to a marginal increase in the ownership share at any point in the unit interval. In practice, however,
particular thresholds of ownership shares (e.g. 50% or 100%) may be critical for obtaining residual control
rights. We exploit the full variation in ownership shares in our main analysis but address the possibility
of non-linearities by considering a discrete choice across ownership categories in a robustness check in
Section 4.3.5.
Third, by approximating the contractibility µ of the subsidiary’s investments with the quality of con-
tracting institutions in the subsidiary’s country, we have implicitly assumed that courts in this country are
responsible for enforcing the subsidiary’s investment decisions. This assumption indeed seems to reflect
the prevailing legal practice in many countries.31 It seems possible, however, that µ may also be affected
by the quality of contracting institutions in the HQ’s country – either directly, if courts in the HQ’s country
rule over contracts between the two firms; or indirectly, if multinationals transfer their institutional practices
to their subsidiaries (see Chari et al., 2010). Note that we control for the potentially confounding role of
contracting institutions in the HQ’s country via FE.
3.2 DATA SOURCES
All data on firms and firm pairs used in our analysis are taken from the Orbis database provided by Bureau
van Dijk (BvD). Most importantly, we observe firms’ direct ownership shares (in percent) in their sub-
sidiaries in 2014, which we use as our measure of Shm.32 We further exploit information on the firms’ main
activities (industry affiliations in the form of four-digit NAICS 2012 codes), their founding years, employ-
ment, and key balance sheet items in 2013. The three key advantages of the Orbis database for our purpose
are the availability of firm-pair specific ownership information, its large international coverage, and the fact
that it includes both domestic and international ownership links. The database is unique in encompassing
31For instance, the European Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 (see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:L:2001:012:0001:0023:en:PDF) cites the default legal principle that “jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s
domicile” (in our context, the subsidiary’s country). This principle typically applies to contracts between firm pairs within the EU
(and potentially also to cases in which one of the two firms is an EU resident), unless specified otherwise by the contracting parties.
Also, the Chinese Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures explicitly stipulates that “All activities of an equity joint venture shall
be governed by the laws and regulations of the People’s Republic of China” (see http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/
chineselaw/200301/20030100062855.shtml, both accessed on May 10, 2017).
32These data were provided by BvD in the form of two customized data extractions in 2014 (for balance sheets and other firm
variables) and 2015 (for ownership shares). The exact date of the ownership information varies by observation and depends on the
latest information available, but it refers to the year 2014 in the majority of cases. We additionally have biannual information on
ownership shares for the years 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012, which we use in robustness checks.
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all three of these features.33
Our sample includes firms that are classified by BvD as medium, large, and very large. We consider only
those HQ that are classified as ‘industrial companies’, thereby excluding pension funds, public authorities,
and financial companies. Furthermore, we restrict our analysis to direct ownership shares of at least 10%,
a conventional threshold for direct investment. We implement these sample restrictions because we are
interested in HQ that have a (potentially long-term) economic interest in the target firm – as described by our
model – and do not merely invest due to (short-term) portfolio considerations. The resulting sample includes
information on direct ownership shares for 605,547 firm pairs of 288,450 headquarters from 113 countries
owning 562,243 subsidiaries in 126 countries in the cross-section of 2014. The median HQ has only a single
subsidiary, which is typically located in the same country; yet, one third of all HQ owns shares in at least two
subsidiaries, and 11% of them are multinational firms owning foreign subsidiaries (which make up around
one fifth of the observations in our data). In this sample, the mean ownership share is 75%, with a standard
deviation of 30. Full ownership is most common (46% of all firm pairs) and 18% of the ownership shares
range between 50 and 51%. We explicitly address these distributional features in Section 4.3.5.
We take the ‘rule of law’ index from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2010) as
our baseline measure of the quality of a country’s contracting institutions C`. This measure is a weighted
average of a number of variables that reflect experts’ and practitioners’ assessments of the effectiveness and
predictability of judicial quality and the enforcement of contracts in a given country and year. We use this
index as our main measure since it is available for a large number of countries and is well-established in the
literature as a valid proxy for the quality of a country’s contracting institutions (see e.g. Antràs, 2015; Nunn,
2007; Nunn and Trefler, 2014). However, we test the sensitivity of our results to using a wide range of
alternative proxies for the quality of contracting institutions, which we describe in Section 4.3.1. Table B.1
provides a full list of subsidiary countries in our data, ranked by the rule of law index. The table shows that
both the number of subsidiaries and the average ownership shares tend to be lower in countries with poor
contracting institutions.
Our industry-level measure of relationship-specificity Ri is taken from Antràs and Chor (2013), who
compute it from the Rauch (1999) classification of products by their degree of horizontal differentiation.34
This classification distinguishes three categories of goods: (i) homogenous (traded on an organized ex-
change), (ii) reference-priced (not sold on an organized exchange, but reference prices are quoted in trade
publications), and (iii) differentiated (all residual goods). For each industry, our baseline measure of Ri
is calculated as the share of product codes in the industry that are classified as differentiated or reference-
priced.35 The idea underlying this approach is that, unlike homogenous goods, differentiated goods are
33The Orbis ownership data have previously been used to study the international transmission of shocks through multinationals
(Cravino and Levchenko, 2017), the hierarchical complexity of business groups (Altomonte and Rungi, 2013), and the effect of
managerial culture on firm boundaries (Kukharskyy, 2016; Gorodnichenko et al., 2017).
34These data are available on the authors’ websites at the six-digit 2002 U.S Input-Output industry classification level. We map
them to the four-digit NAICS 2012 level using official correspondence tables provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis: http:
//www.bea.gov/industry/xls/2002DetailedItemOutput.xls and by the US Census Bureau: http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/
concordances/concordances.html (both accessed on April 4, 2016).
35Due to ambiguities for some goods, there are two versions of the Rauch (1999) classification, a ‘conservative’ and a ‘liberal’
one, whereby the former maximizes and the latter minimizes the number of goods that are classified as differentiated. Following
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customized to the specific needs of a buyer-seller relationship. The more differentiated goods there are
within a given industry, the thinner is the outside market for the typical goods produced in this industry,
and hence, the higher is the relationship-specificity. The size of the sample for our main regression analysis
is reduced by the availability of the Rauch relationship-specificity measure for the subsidiary’s industry.
Summary statistics for the main estimation sample are provided in Table B.2.
The vectors of control variablesXhm andYhm include, in addition to various sets of FE, the following
observable characteristics of the subsidiary’s country and industry, the ownership structure, and the country
pair, which may affect the depth of integration. For the subsidiary’s country, we take the log of GDP as a
measure of country size; the log of GDP per capita as a proxy for the income and wage level; the log of the
endowment ratio (K`/L`), defined as the real capital stock divided by employment (average hours worked
by employed persons), as a measure of relative factor abundance; and the average years of schooling as a
proxy for the human capital stock (Barro and Lee, 1996). These variables are taken from the Penn World
Tables (version 8.1; see Feenstra et al., 2013) for the year 2010. To control for industry-level differences
in capital intensity, we include the log of the capital-to-employment ratio (Ki/Li) of the median firm by
industry in the Orbis dataset for the year 2013, along with a Heckscher-Ohlin-type interaction term of
the industry’s capital intensity with the endowment ratio: ln (Ki/Li)⇥ ln (K`/L`). We further control
for three variables capturing the nature of the ownership structure: (i) the number of subsidiaries of the
HQ, (ii) the number of shareholders of the subsidiary, and (iii) a dummy indicating domestic (as opposed
to international) ownership links.36 The first two variables capture the complexity of the business group
(cf. Altomonte and Rungi, 2013; Schwarz and Suedekum, 2014). The motivation for including the third
variable is that international ownership may involve additional fixed costs that affect the ownership shares.
We proxy for bilateral investment costs by using a set of standard gravity control variables from the CEPII
dataset (Head et al., 2010): the distance between the most populous cities in log kilometers, the time zone
difference in hours, and indicator variables for countries sharing a common border, official language, or
(current or past) colonial link.
Finally, the vectors Xhm and Yhm also include control variables for other characteristics of the insti-
tutional environment in the subsidiary’s country. These characteristics, such as financial development or
intellectual property rights protection, are correlated with the quality of contracting institutions, and they
may also affect the integration decision. To ensure that the rule of law index does not pick up the effects of
other types of institutions, we control for them using a set of proxies that have previously been used in the
international economics literature (see e.g. Nunn and Trefler, 2014; Javorcik, 2004): financial development,
approximated by the sum of private credit and stock market capitalization divided by GDP from the World
Bank’s Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) in 2012; labor market flexibility, defined as one
Alfaro et al. (2015) and Antràs and Chor (2013), we use the liberal classification in our baseline analysis and the conservative
version in robustness checks. Also, reference-priced goods may be understood as either differentiated or homogenous. We treat
reference-priced goods as differentiated in our baseline analysis and classify them as non-differentiated in robustness checks.
36Due to missing observations for the variables provided in Orbis, we define the number of subsidiaries (shareholders) as the
maximum value of the number of subsidiaries (shareholders) reported by BvD (which may include non-manufacturing firms, public
entities, or private persons) and the number of subsidiaries (shareholders) actually observed in the database.
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minus the rigidity of employment index from the World Bank’s Doing Business Reports (based on Botero
et al., 2004), averaged over the period 2004-2009 (the years when the index was reported); the index of
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection developed by Park (2008) in 2010 (the last available year); and
the expropriation risk score in the first quarter of 2014, based on expert assessments by the information
services company IHS Markit.37
4 ESTIMATION RESULTS
4.1 OWNERSHIP SHARES AND CONTRACTING INSTITUTIONS
Table 1 summarizes our estimation results for different specifications of equation (18). It substantiates the
fact illustrated in Figure 1(a) that subsidiaries are more deeply integrated in countries with better contracting
institutions. Column 1 reports a positive unconditional correlation between the ownership share and the rule
of law index, which is highly significant. The coefficient estimate increases as we successively add control
variables for characteristics of the subsidiary’s country and industry, the ownership structure (column 2), and
bilateral investment costs (column 3).38 Ownership shares tend to be lower in countries with a more educated
population, while the other country characteristics are insignificant. The industry’s capital intensity enters
negatively, while the Heckscher-Ohlin interaction term is weakly positive. Domestic ownership links are
characterized by lower shares than international links, presumably reflecting the idea that investing abroad
is associated with additional fixed costs, which are only worth paying in case of a substantial stake in a
foreign company. The average ownership share also decreases (somewhat mechanically) in the number of
shareholders. Most proxies for bilateral investment costs seem to have no significant effect on ownership
shares, but we find a stable negative correlation with the common language dummy.
The positive correlation between the depth of integration and the quality of contracting institutions is
also confirmed in columns 4-5 of Table 1, where we control for unobservable factors using large sets of
FE. After adding FE for the subsidiary’s country, the HQ’s country, and the HQ’s industry in column 4,
the point estimate is reduced almost by half, but it remains highly significant. The estimate is very similar
when we further include HQ country-industry FE in column 5. In column 6, we control for several other
dimensions of institutional quality in the subsidiary’s country, namely financial development, labor market
flexibility, IPR protection, and expropriation risk. The results indicate that ownership shares are higher in
more financially developed countries, those with better IPR protection, and (perhaps surprisingly) countries
with higher expropriation risk. Most importantly, the estimated coefficient for the rule of law index remains
positive and significant at the one percent level. This preferred estimate suggests that firms choose ownership
shares which are higher by around 11 percentage points in countries with a rule of law index that is higher
by one standard deviation (in the cross-country sample in 2014).
37The score assesses the “risk that the government will expropriate or nationalise assets”. A key advantage of the country risk
scores by IHS Markit is that they distinguish the risk of expropriation by the government from the risk that the judicial system may
not enforce contracts between private parties, which we exploit in a robustness check.
38The number of observations declines with more demanding specifications in Table 1 because control variables are missing for
some firm pairs and observations are dropped if they are fully explained by the FE.
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TABLE 1: Ownership shares and contracting institutions
Dependent variable: ownership share Plain Control variables Fixed effects (FE) Other
subsidiary bilateral 3 FE 2 FE institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rule of law (subsidiary country) 5.639*** 13.78*** 13.41*** 7.657*** 7.439*** 11.12***
(2.130) (3.552) (3.298) (1.727) (1.761) (2.540)
ln GDP (subsidiary country) 1.868 3.264 0.528 0.180 -0.626
(3.450) (3.061) (0.906) (1.008) (3.995)
ln GDP per capita (subsidiary country) -6.764 -6.286 -2.913 -2.265 0.606
(4.790) (4.847) (2.931) (3.034) (7.956)
ln (K`/L`) (subsidiary country) -8.084 -9.103 -2.932* -2.413 -2.715
(5.954) (5.582) (1.556) (1.640) (4.978)
ln years of schooling (subsidiary country) -48.31** -45.47* -25.72** -26.66** -57.51***
(23.27) (24.42) (10.47) (10.70) (14.92)
ln (Ki/Li) (subsidiary industry) -5.132** -4.753*
(2.578) (2.625)
ln (K`/L`)⇥ ln (Ki/Li) (subsidiary) 0.639* 0.585* 0.168 0.106 0.0570
(0.339) (0.347) (0.173) (0.170) (0.159)
Domestic ownership link dummy -8.920*** -15.01*** -8.432*** -7.779*** -3.942**
(1.995) (4.333) (1.602) (1.564) (1.917)
Number of subsidiaries (headquarters) -0.0158* -0.0134 -0.00854 -0.0137* -0.0114
(0.00863) (0.00877) (0.00629) (0.00705) (0.00777)
Number of shareholders (subsidiary) -0.787** -0.788** -0.770** -0.739** -0.665**
(0.366) (0.367) (0.360) (0.347) (0.318)
ln distance -1.186 0.0639 -0.114 1.552
(2.376) (0.681) (0.663) (1.022)
Time zone difference (hours) -1.084* -0.330 -0.271 -0.335
(0.646) (0.422) (0.409) (0.340)
Common border dummy -1.298 0.672 0.533 1.622
(2.909) (1.076) (0.990) (1.321)
Common language dummy -5.979*** -4.279** -4.518** -3.301*
(1.801) (1.808) (1.714) (1.708)
Colonial link dummy 1.981 1.759 1.882 1.005
(1.907) (2.351) (2.228) (2.328)
Financial development (subsidiary country) 0.0441***
(0.0137)
Labor market flexibility (subsidiary country) -6.369
(4.508)
IPR protection (subsidiary country) 8.078*
(4.466)
Expropriation risk (subsidiary country) 11.21***
(2.195)
Subsidiary industry fixed effects (FE) no no no yes yes yes
Headquarters country and industry FE no no no yes nested nested
Headquarters country-industry FE no no no no yes yes
Observations 605,547 525,653 524,597 524,206 522,792 433,108
R2 0.026 0.127 0.133 0.229 0.265 0.278
The table reports estimates of (variations of) equation (18). Standard errors clustered by subsidiary country and by HQ are
reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
We interpret this result as indicative evidence for Proposition 1, which predicts that firms choose deeper
integration of their subsidiaries located in countries with better contracting institutions. However, despite
the large set of control variables included in our preferred specification from column 6 of Table 1, there may
be unobserved country-specific factors that are correlated with contracting institutions and firm boundaries.
Hence, these regressions cannot identify the causal effect of contracting institutions on ownership shares.
This caveat notwithstanding, we can state that after controlling for a wide range of relevant covariates
and a host of unobservables, we continue to find a positive correlation between the quality of contracting
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institutions in the subsidiary’s country and the depth of integration, in line with the PRT.
Before turning to the analysis of the interaction effect, we briefly pause to compare our results to the
existing literature. Note that the implications of our estimates differ from Acemoglu et al. (2009), who
find no significant correlation between their firm-level index of vertical integration and various proxies for
contracting institutions. One potential explanation is that they examine (primary and secondary) activities
that are fully integrated within the same firm, whereas we examine partial ownership shares across firms.
However, besides these conceptual differences, the discrepancy in results may also be explained by the
confounding role of contracting institutions in the HQ’s country. To see this, note that Acemoglu et al.
(2009) examine the degree of vertical integration of a given firm by examining input-output relationships
between its various economic activities, all of which are presumably located in the same country. Yet, as
shown by Antràs and Helpman (2008), contracting institutions have the opposite effect on firm boundaries
depending on whether they affect the contractibility of a HQ’s or a subsidiary’s inputs. If both the subsidiary
and the HQ are located in the same country, a single country-level proxy for contracting institutions may
confound these opposing effects. Our data features two important advantages that enable us to resolve this
issue: They include international ownership links as well as multiple links for some firms. This allows us
to fully control for contracting institutions in the HQ’s country by FE. Provided that the HQ’s investments
are fully governed by contracting institutions in the HQ’s country, we can identify the positive relationship
between contracting institutions in the subsidiary’s country and the depth of integration.
4.2 OWNERSHIP SHARES, CONTRACTING INSTITUTIONS, AND RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFICITY
In Table 2, we provide empirical evidence supporting the idea that better contracting institutions have a
stronger positive effect on ownership shares for subsidiaries producing highly relationship-specific inputs,
as predicted by Proposition 2. The table develops our preferred specification of equation (19) step by step.
In column 1, we examine the correlation without any control variables, which reveals a positive estimate of
the interaction term. It suggests that the positive correlation between the rule of law index and ownership
shares is concentrated in industries with high relationship-specificity, in line with Figure 1(b).
In column 2, when we control for the observable variables from the third column of Table 1, the point
estimate for the interaction term becomes smaller and insignificant.39 However, significance is restored
as we add FE for the HQ’s country and industry along with subsidiary industry FE in column 3. As an
important step towards identification, we add subsidiary country FE in column 4. Note that this specification
is superior to simple cross-country regressions, as it identifies the effect of country-level institutions across
industries with varying degrees of relationship-specificity after controlling for any unobservable country
characteristics. We control for further potential confounding factors, such as international differences in
financing conditions of a given industry, by adding HQ country-industry FE in column 5. Finally, to account
39For relationship-specificity, we find insignificant estimates with switching signs, which is not surprising given the ambiguity
predicted by our model (see Section 2.3). The coefficient estimates for the control variables are not reported to save space. We
choose not to include the additional institutional measures from column 6 of Table 1 because they would substantially reduce the
sample and are subsequently controlled for via subsidiary country FE.
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TABLE 2: Ownership shares, contracting institutions, and relationship-specificity
Dep. var.: ownership share Plain Controls 3 FE 4 FE Cty-ind. FE Pair FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rule of law ⇥ specificity (subsidiary) 6.975*** 3.327 2.748** 2.464** 3.476*** 3.432***
(1.634) (2.270) (1.172) (1.085) (0.973) (0.909)
Rule of law (subsidiary country) -1.703 7.734*** 4.924***
(1.502) (2.261) (1.200)
Specificity (subsidiary industry) -2.090 0.197
(1.324) (2.160)
Control variables from Table 1 no yes yes yes yes yes
Subsidiary industry FE no no yes yes yes yes
Subsidiary country FE no no no yes yes nested
Headquarters country and industry FE no no yes yes nested nested
Headquarters country-industry FE no no no no yes yes
Country-pair FE no no no no no yes
Observations 230,937 187,716 187,587 187,587 186,092 186,110
R2 0.024 0.128 0.228 0.242 0.288 0.295
The table reports estimates of (variations of) equation (19). Standard errors clustered by subsidiary country-industry and
by HQ are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
for unobserved bilateral factors like cultural differences or ethnic ties, we include country-pair FE to arrive
at our preferred specification in column 6. In all of the regressions with FE, we find a significantly positive
estimate for the interaction effect. The estimated size of the effect is quite stable across all specifications in
columns 2 through 6. A quantitative interpretation of the preferred estimate suggests that an improvement
in contracting institutions by one standard deviation would increase the ownership share by 3.4 percentage
points more for a subsidiary in a highly relationship-specific industry (composed of differentiated goods
only) compared to a subsidiary in a non-specific (homogenous) industry.
Our estimation results provide strong support for Proposition 2, and hence for the PRT. In line with
this theoretical prediction, we find that firms choose ceteris paribus deeper integration of subsidiaries in
countries with better contracting institutions, and this effect increases in the relationship-specificity of the
subsidiary’s industry. Intuitively, there is less need to incentivize the subsidiary’s ex-ante investments if
contracting institutions are better and courts are able to enforce contracts on a wider range of issues. This
mechanism is more pronounced for subsidiaries producing relationship-specific inputs, since the adverse
effect of a higher ownership share on the subsidiary’s underinvestment is mitigated in industries with higher
degrees of relationship-specificity. Therefore, contracting institutions have a disproportionately positive
effect on the integration decision in relationship-specific industries.
As mentioned in the introduction, the only empirical analysis to date that has studied the interaction
effect of contracting institutions and relationship-specificity on firm boundaries is by Antràs (2015, see his
Table 8.9). Using the ratio of intra-firm imports to arm’s-length imports by U.S. industries as a dependent
variable, he finds a negative and significant interaction effect, which is however not robust to more strin-
gent testing. In particular, the estimate is rendered insignificant after controlling for interactions of GDP
per capita with industry dummies. We propose three possible explanations for the difference between these
inconclusive results and our positive estimates, which are robust to the same test and several other checks,
as shown in the next section. First, since our sample covers HQ in many countries, while Antràs (2015)
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considers only U.S. imports, the differences may be explained by particular features of the U.S. economy.
Second, larger ownership shares do not necessarily translate into higher intra-firm trade volumes. In partic-
ular, the U.S. data classify all firm pairs with ownership shares exceeding 6% as related parties, and there
might be large trade volumes between partially integrated firms. Third, and related, compositional effects
within industries may mask the positive interaction effect that we have identified at the level of firm pairs.40
4.3 ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
This section discusses the following challenges to identification: measurement of key explanatory variables,
potentially remaining confounding factors, robustness across samples, selection into production countries,
non-linearities in ownership decisions, and the possibility of reverse causality. We use several variations
of our preferred specifications as well as alternative estimation techniques to find that our main results are
remarkably robust to addressing each of these challenges.
4.3.1 ALTERNATIVE MEASUREMENT OF KEY VARIABLES
As a first step, Table 3 experiments with alternative measures of our key explanatory variables. In Panel A,
we reestimate equation (18) using several alternative proxies for the quality of contracting institutions C`,
and in Panel B, we employ the same proxies to estimate the interaction effect in equation (19). All regres-
sions are based on our preferred specifications from the final columns of Tables 1 and 2, respectively. We use
the following proxies for contracting institutions, which are described in detail in Table B.3 and defined such
that a higher value indicates better institutional quality: the index of contract enforcement between private
parties by IHS Markit (column 1), the law and order component of the International Country Risk Guide
by Political Risk Services (PRS, column 2), the inverse distance to the frontier in enforcing contracts from
the World Bank’s Doing Business (WBDB) database (column 3), the index of legal formalism developed
by Djankov et al. (2003, column 4), the index of property rights freedom by the Heritage foundation (col-
umn 5), and the enforceability of contracts measure by Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI,
column 6). As reported in Panel A, the conditional correlation with the ownership share is estimated to be
positive for each of the six proxies for contracting institutions, and it is highly significant in four cases. An
even clearer picture emerges from Panel B. The estimated interaction effects of our alternative proxies for
contracting institutions with relationship-specificity are positive and significant at the five percent level in all
cases (and at the one percent level in all but one case). This allows us to conclude that our main estimation
results are robust to using a wide range of alternative measures of the quality of contracting institutions.
In Panel C of Table 3, we examine alternative measures of relationship-specificity. The first three
columns use variants of the Rauch (1999) classification. In column 1, we reclassify referenced-priced goods
as non-differentiated (instead of differentiated), but adhere to the liberal classification. Next, we use the
conservative (rather than liberal) variant of the classification, alternatively denominating referenced-priced
40While Antràs (2015) controls for productivity dispersion within industries, this term approximates only one of several relevant
dimensions of micro-level heterogeneity that we account for in Section 4.3.2.
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TABLE 3: Alternative measurement of key variables
Dep. var.: ownership share IHS Markit PRS WBDB Djankov Heritage BERI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. First-order effect for alternative measures of contracting institutions
Contracting institutions 11.56*** 4.836 1.270 3.528** 10.45*** 8.080***
(3.597) (3.119) (1.169) (1.707) (2.063) (2.056)
Observations 433,108 433,108 433,108 430,271 433,108 426,996
R2 0.276 0.275 0.275 0.279 0.278 0.282
B. Interaction effect for alternative measures of contracting institutions
Contracting institutions ⇥ specificity 4.314*** 3.816*** 2.344*** 2.449*** 3.427*** 1.765**
(1.523) (0.896) (0.862) (0.759) (0.925) (0.866)
Observations 185,650 186,110 186,110 184,829 186,110 173,621
R2 0.295 0.295 0.295 0.296 0.295 0.297
C. Interaction effect for alternative measures of relationship-specificity
Rauch specificity measures Relationship duration
diff. conserv. diff. & cons. baseline HQ firm FE 2 firm FE
Rule of law ⇥ specificity (alternative) 1.135* 1.667*** 3.401***
(0.598) (0.620) (1.292)
Rule of law ⇥ relationship duration 1.388*** 1.778*** 2.887*
(0.481) (0.456) (1.692)
Relationship duration 0.909 1.789*** 2.552
(0.571) (0.516) (2.100)
HQ firm FE no no no no yes yes
Subsidiary firm FE no no no no no yes
Observations 186,110 186,110 186,110 523,322 362,339 19,679
R2 0.295 0.295 0.295 0.281 0.615 0.846
Panel A reports estimates of equation (18), including all control variables and FE from column 6 of Table 1. Panels B
and C report estimates of equation (19), including all control variables and FE from column 6 of Table 2. Panels A and B
use the alternative measures of the quality of contracting institutions listed in the header, which are described in Table B.3.
Panel C uses alternative measures of relationship-specificity described in the text. Standard errors clustered by subsidiary
country and by HQ (Panel A) or by subsidiary country-industry and by HQ (Panels B and C) are reported in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
goods as differentiated (column 2) or non-differentiated (column 3). Again, all three regressions confirm
the significantly positive interaction effect. In columns 4 to 6, we use a proxy for relationship-specificity
that is specific to the firm pair. We compute the number of years in which a given firm pair is consecutively
observed in our biannual data for 2004-2014, normalized by the maximum number of observed years, and
call this measure the ‘relationship duration’. This approach builds on the recent theoretical work by Martin
et al. (2016), which suggests that the duration of firm relationships may serve as a revealed measure of their
specificity. Intuitively, long-term relationships are more likely to involve relationship-specific investments
that have a lower value on the outside market. We compute the relationship duration for all firm pairs in
our data and can therefore estimate our preferred specification with the alternative measure in a much larger
sample (see column 4). The estimated interaction effect is positive and significant, as predicted by Proposi-
tion 2. Since the relationship duration is specific to the firm pair, our setup further allows us to control for
firm-specific effects. To this end, we gradually add firm FE for the HQ (column 5) and the subsidiary (col-
umn 6) to our specification. While this narrows down our sample to firms with multiple ownership links,
27
it allows us to control for unobservable firm characteristics that may affect the integration decision, such
as the managers’ time preferences (see Kukharskyy, 2016). We find a highly significant interaction effect
within HQ, which remains significant at the ten percent level even when identified from variation within
headquarters and within subsidiaries. These estimates strongly corroborate our main findings.
4.3.2 ADDITIONAL CONTROL VARIABLES
In this section, we return to our baseline measures and account for potentially confounding factors by in-
cluding additional control variables in our preferred specifications. We start by controlling for a variety
of differential effects of subsidiary country and industry characteristics, then explicitly account for firm
heterogeneity, and finally control for remaining unobservables, including HQ firm FE.
Table 4 first addresses the possibility that country-specific variables may have differential effects across
industries. Even after controlling for country FE, the interaction effect in equation (19) might be confounded
by other characteristics of the subsidiary’s country, such as economic development or other institutions,
which are positively correlated with the quality of contracting institutions. If these country characteristics
affect the firms’ integration decisions and if they have a different effect in more specific industries, this may
bias our estimates. Moreover, subsidiary country characteristics may affect the ownership decisions through
channels other than relationship-specificity. To account for all of these channels, we adopt a very general
approach that controls for arbitrary effects of country-specific factors across industries. We begin by con-
trolling for the differential effects of economic size and economic development by adding two full sets of in-
teraction terms of subsidiary industry dummies with GDP and GDP per capita in the subsidiary’s country to
our main specification of equation (19). This approach was first developed by Levchenko (2007) for studying
exports and adopted by Antràs (2015) in a context similar to our paper. Column 1 of Table 4 shows that our
main interaction effect is fully robust to this important robustness check. In columns 2-3, we proceed anal-
ogously by controlling for interaction terms of subsidiary industry dummies with proxies for endowments
(capital-labor ratio and human capital) and the quality of other types of institutions (financial development,
labor market flexibility, IPR protection, and expropriation risk) in the subsidiary’s country, respectively.41
We find that these tests do not alter our previous conclusions, as the estimated main interaction effect main-
tains a similar magnitude as in the baseline regression and is always significant at conventional levels.
It is also conceivable that technological features of the subsidiary’s industry have varying effects on own-
ership shares across country characteristics other than the ones considered in columns 1-3. To the extent that
these technological features are reflected in the capital intensity of the subsidiary’s industry, we can control
for them very generally through interaction terms of capital intensity with subsidiary country dummies. Our
main finding is confirmed after adding these control variables in column 4 of Table 4. We can apply an even
more stringent tests by combining several of the aforementioned sets of interaction terms in a single regres-
sion. Note that including all of the above interaction effects makes inference impossible due to the large
number of covariates. We therefore report the results of regressions including two different combinations of
41These variables are defined in Section 3.2.
28
TABLE 4: Controlling for differential effects of subsidiary country and industry characteristics
Dep. var.: ownership share GDP Endowments Institutions IndustryK/L Combination 1 Combination 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rule of law ⇥ specificity 3.318** 3.907*** 4.499** 3.402*** 3.073* 4.641***
(1.472) (1.251) (1.867) (0.909) (1.815) (1.664)
Observations 186,110 186,110 152,642 186,110 157,166 156,707
R2 0.298 0.298 0.309 0.296 0.307 0.307
The table reports estimates of equation (19). All regressions include the control variables and fixed effects from column 6 of
Table 2. In addition, we control for interactions of a full set of subsidiary industry dummies with the following characteristics
of the subsidiary country: GDP and GDP per capita in column 1, endowments (capital-labor ratio and human capital) in
column 2, and other institutions (financial development, labor market flexibility, IPR protection, and expropriation risk)
in column 3. Column 4 includes interactions of a full set of subsidiary country dummies with the subsidiary industry’s
capital intensity. In column 5, we control for interactions of industry dummies with GDP per capita, the capital-labor ratio,
and financial development, as well as interactions of industry capital intensity with country dummies. In column 6, we
control for interactions of industry dummies with human capital, financial development, and expropriation risk, as well as
interactions of industry capital intensity with country dummies. Standard errors clustered by subsidiary country-industry
and by HQ are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
interaction terms (though other combinations yield similar results). The specification reported in column 5
includes four sets of variables that seem a priori most important: interaction terms of industry dummies with
GDP per capita, the capital-labor ratio, and financial development, as well as interaction terms of country
dummies with industry-level capital intensity. In the last column, we continue to control for arbitrary effects
of industry capital intensity across subsidiary countries, but add interactions of industry dummies with the set
of country characteristics that are individually significant in Table 1: human capital, financial development,
and expropriation risk. We continue to find a significantly positive interaction effect between contracting in-
stitutions and relationship-specificity in these highly demanding specifications and conclude that differential
effects of other relevant country and industry characteristics cannot explain our main findings.
Table 5 addresses potentially remaining concerns about omitted variables related to the characteris-
tics of the individual firms. While we have abstracted from firm heterogeneity in our theoretical model,
differences across firms – both headquarters and subsidiaries – may potentially play a role for ownership
decisions. For instance, one might suspect that particularly large and productive subsidiary firms are more
lucrative investment targets, therefore attracting higher ownership shares; alternatively, one might argue that
large and productive firms are more likely to be listed on the stock exchange and thus characterized by
widespread shareholdings. In either case, if firms producing relationship-specific goods can grow larger
on average (e.g. due to market power), and if these firms tend to locate in countries with better contracting
institutions (e.g. due to better infrastructure), then neglecting firm heterogeneity might bias the estimate of
our main interaction effect. One could construct similar narratives for other dimensions of firm heterogene-
ity. For this reason, we control for the following observable characteristics of the subsidiary firm, which
may be relevant for ownership shares: firm size (measured by ln employment), labor productivity (defined
as ln(value added/employment)), the firm’s age, its capital intensity (defined as ln(capital/employment)),
and a shareholder dummy, indicating whether the subsidiary itself holds any shares in other firms. These
variables are lagged by one year (based on unconsolidated financial accounts in Orbis in 2013), which ame-
liorates potential concerns regarding reverse causality. The estimation results reported in columns 1 and 2
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of Table 5 strengthen our main findings, as the interaction effect is estimated to be even larger than in our
main regression. They further reveal that ownership shares are in fact higher for larger, more productive, and
older subsidiaries, while they are lower for subsidiaries that are more capital intensive or are shareholders
themselves.
TABLE 5: Firm heterogeneity
Dep. var.: ownership share Subsidiary firm controls Headquarters firm controls Both firm controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rule of law 5.348** 6.406*** 4.307**
(1.861) (1.439) (1.437)
Rule of law ⇥ specificity 4.309** 7.446*** 2.650
(1.774) (2.538) (3.455)
Employment (subsidiary) 1.972*** 2.650*** -0.0281 0.697***
(0.505) (0.165) (0.516) (0.263)
Labor productivity (subsidiary) 0.257 0.922*** -1.376* -0.546
(0.451) (0.235) (0.710) (0.416)
Age (subsidiary) 0.0291** 0.0184** 0.0540*** 0.0353**
(0.0119) (0.00887) (0.0117) (0.0179)
Capital intensity (subsidiary) -0.631*** -0.355*** -1.292*** -0.856***
(0.191) (0.101) (0.261) (0.162)
Shareholder dummy (subsidiary) -3.157*** -3.411*** -4.068*** -4.365***
(0.383) (0.352) (0.456) (0.603)
Employment (headquarters) 2.320*** 2.031*** 2.759*** 2.373***
(0.401) (0.210) (0.377) (0.221)
Labor productivity (headquarters) 1.672*** 1.649*** 2.253*** 2.273***
(0.237) (0.242) (0.224) (0.304)
Age (headquarters) -0.0753*** -0.0778*** -0.0694*** -0.0682***
(0.00791) (0.0165) (0.00699) (0.0203)
Capital intensity (headquarters) 0.838*** 0.677*** 1.226*** 0.987***
(0.220) (0.119) (0.141) (0.147)
Subsidiary dummy (headquarters) 1.505 2.156*** 0.880 1.852*
(1.389) (0.810) (1.509) (1.085)
Observations 106,829 53,353 84,520 36,153 42,757 19,325
R2 0.229 0.263 0.241 0.269 0.259 0.295
Columns 1, 3, and 5 report estimates of equation (18), including all the control variables and FE from column 6 of Table 1.
Columns 2, 4, and 6 report estimates of equation (19), including all the control variables and FE from column 6 of Table 2.
In addition, we control for one-year lags of the listed firm-level control variables for the subsidiary firm (columns 1-2),
for the HQ (columns 3-4), and for both firms (columns 5-6). Standard errors clustered by subsidiary country and by HQ
(columns 1, 3, and 5) or by subsidiary country-industry and by HQ (columns 2, 4, and 6) are reported in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
In the next step, we control for firm heterogeneity among HQ. We include the same lagged firm charac-
teristics as in the case of subsidiaries, except for the shareholder dummy, which is replaced by a subsidiary
dummy, indicating whether the HQ itself is owned (to some degree) by other firms in our data. Columns 3
and 4 of Table 5 confirm the positive estimates for the rule of law index and its interaction effect with
relationship-specificity, both of which are highly significant in this further reduced sample. Larger, more
productive, and capital intensive HQ tend to own higher ownership shares; age enters negatively; and evi-
dence on the subsidiary dummy is inconclusive. In the last two columns of Table 5, we include the control
variables for both firms. We find that both the direct and the interaction effect have the predicted signs,
but only the former is statistically significant. The insignificance of the interaction effect is likely to be
explained by the reduced sample, which is smaller by an order of magnitude compared to our main estima-
tion. The remaining sample covers only 21 subsidiary countries, predominantly EU members, which are
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characterized by similar contracting institutions, and hence little variation in the rule of law index. Thus,
the lack of significance in this sample is not surprising. Given that controlling for firm variables drastically
reduces our sample, we omit them in our main analysis. Most importantly, the positive point estimates for
our interaction effect in these robustness checks suggest that firm heterogeneity does not cause an upward
bias in our main regression.
In our main analysis, we have abstracted from political barriers to FDI. However, many countries main-
tain policy restrictions on foreign equity ownership. Such restrictions on foreign equity are measured by
the OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index across 62 countries and 22 industries in 2014.42 We
modify our main estimation equations to include this index for the subsidiary’s country plus an interaction
term of the index with a dummy variable indicating foreign ownership relationships, since FDI restrictions
are expected to have a differential effect on international investments. Unreported estimation results reveal
that this robustness check leaves our main estimates for the effect of rule of law and its interaction with
relationship-specificity unaffected in terms of both economic size and statistical significance.
Table 6 controls for remaining sources of unobserved heterogeneity in the data. While we have already
addressed primary concerns regarding omitted variables, one can still envision more intricate narratives of
potentially confounding factors. For instance, institutions in the HQ country may have a differential effect on
ownership shares across industries (in addition to the direct effects that we have controlled for throughout).
Similarly, the effects of other characteristics of the HQ country might vary across subsidiary industries. The
most general way to address these issues is by augmenting our baseline specifications with an additional
set of FE for each combination of HQ countries and subsidiary industries. The results of estimating these
augmented specifications, reported in the first two columns of Table 6, support our main predictions.
So far, we have controlled for the (technological) fundamentals of both parties’ industries via HQ and
subsidiary FE. However, it is conceivable that industry-pair specific factors may also affect ownership shares.
For instance, Antràs and Chor (2013) show that the integration decision is affected by the interaction of
‘downstreamness’ of the subsidiary’s industry with the demand elasticity for final goods, which may be
interpreted as an industry characteristic of the HQ in case the subsidiary is a vertically integrated supplier.
To control for these (and other) unobservables, columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 add industry-pair FE to the
previous specifications. Again, the size and significance of both key estimates hardly change, which is why
these computationally intensive FE are omitted in the main analysis.
A significant advantage of our data over those used in previous studies is that we can separately identify
both firms that form an ownership link – the HQ and the subsidiary. To fully exploit this advantage, we
proceed by identifying the effect of contracting institutions from variation across different subsidiary coun-
tries and industries within the same HQ. For this purpose, we add HQ firm FE to the previous specifications
(including also all previously introduced FE). This approach implicitly restricts the sample to HQ that hold
ownership shares in at least two subsidiaries in different countries (or industries for the interaction effect).
42The data are obtained from http://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm. We focus on foreign equity restrictions, since we
find that other types of restrictions captured by the index (e.g. on screening, approval, and foreign personnel) do not affect ownership
shares.
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TABLE 6: Additional unobservable effects and within-firm estimates
Dep. var.: ownership share HQ cty-subsid. ind. FE + Industry-pair FE + HQ firm FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rule of law 10.82*** 10.39*** 7.227***
(2.674) (2.651) (2.073)
Rule of law ⇥ specificity 3.980*** 3.619*** 3.603*
(1.273) (1.319) (2.072)
HQ country-subsidiary industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-pair FE no no yes yes yes yes
HQ firm FE no no no no yes yes
Observations 431,348 185,125 420,630 180,361 283,334 102,055
R2 0.299 0.321 0.337 0.356 0.656 0.679
Columns 1, 3, and 5 report estimates of equation (18), including all the control variables and FE from column 6
of Table 1. Columns 2, 4, and 6 report estimates of equation (19), including all the control variables and
FE from column 6 of Table 2 plus the indicated FE. Standard errors clustered by subsidiary country and by
HQ (columns 1, 3, and 5) or by subsidiary country-industry and by HQ (columns 2, 4, and 6) are reported in
parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Column 5 of Table 6 shows that, within a given firm, the HQ chooses higher ownership shares in those sub-
sidiaries that are located in countries with better contracting institutions. The within-firm estimate for the
effect of rule of law is highly significant and of the same order of magnitude as in the baseline estimation.
Also, as reported in column 6, the estimated interaction effect of rule of law with relationship-specificity has
a similar magnitude as before, though it is estimated with less precision within HQ and only significant at
the 10% level. Overall, the evidence from these highly demanding robustness checks lends further support
to our main predictions.
4.3.3 SUBSAMPLES AND PANEL
In Table 7, we explore the robustness of our preferred specifications in alternative sample configurations.
Panel A shows estimates of equation (18), including all control variables and FE from column 6 of Table 1,
while Panel B considers the preferred specification of equation (19). In our main estimation sample, we
have restricted ownership shares to a minimum of 10% to exclude small investments, which may be driven
by portfolio considerations rather than lasting business interests. When increasing this threshold to 15% in
column 1, we continue to find positive estimates for rule of law and the interaction effect. As noted in the
introduction, a substantial share of the literature concerning the effects of contracting institutions on firm
boundaries has thus far concentrated on international investments and on vertical buyer-seller relationships
(see e.g. Antràs and Chor, 2013; Antràs, 2015). While our theory and empirical analysis are more general,
we now show that our results are relevant to this literature, as they continue to hold even if we exclude
ownership links in the domestic country or in the same industry. In the sample of foreign direct investments
(FDI) in column 2, we find a slightly lower estimate for the rule of law index in the first specification, but
a larger interaction effect. Both estimates are significant at the five percent level, although the sample size
shrinks by a factor of five to seven. Our baseline estimates hardly change when we restrict the sample
to subsidiaries active in a different four-digit NAICS industry from their owner, which we call ‘vertical’
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TABLE 7: Subsamples and panel
Dep. var.: ownership share Subsamples Panel
S 15% FDI Vertical High-income Baseline + FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. First-order effect
Rule of law 11.16*** 7.089** 11.01*** 6.829*** 7.585*** 7.130***
(2.574) (2.996) (2.470) (1.333) (0.577) (0.541)
Subsidiary industry-year FE yes yes
HQ industry-year & country-year FE yes nested
HQ industry-country-year FE no yes
Observations 419,766 65,220 319,236 367,874 1,917,452 1,910,195
R2 0.294 0.192 0.269 0.307 0.224 0.259
Panel B. Interaction effect
Rule of law ⇥ specificity 2.402*** 4.505** 3.608*** 3.590*** 2.727** 2.297**
(0.823) (1.796) (1.065) (1.248) (1.081) (0.912)
Subsidiary industry-year & country-year FE yes yes
HQ industry-year & country-year FE yes nested
Country-pair FE yes nested
HQ industry-country-year FE no yes
Country-pair-year FE no yes
Observations 180,753 34,752 136,234 145,401 788,813 778,994
R2 0.307 0.318 0.297 0.320 0.236 0.289
Panel A reports estimates of equation (18), including all the control variables and FE from column 6 of Table 1. Panel B
reports estimates of equation (19), including all the control variables and FE from column 6 of Table 2. Column 1 includes
only ownership shares of at least 15%. Column 2 restricts the sample to international ownership links (FDI). Column 3
restricts the sample to HQ and subsidiaries in different industries (vertical). Column 4 restricts the sample to high-income
subsidiary countries with above-median GDP per capita. Columns 5 and 6 use the biannual panel from 2004 to 2014,
controlling for the indicated time-varying FE in addition to observables. Standard errors clustered by subsidiary country and
by HQ (Panel A) or by subsidiary country-industry and by HQ (Panel B) are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate
significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
relationships (column 3).43 One might suspect that the quality of contracting institutions varies mainly
between developed and developing countries, but less among OECD countries, which make up the bulk
of observations in the Orbis database. To verify that our estimates are not driven by particular features of
developing countries, we restrict the sample to subsidiaries located in high-income countries in column 4.44
This approach has the additional advantage of excluding subsidiaries located in several small island states,
including so-called ‘offshore financial centers’, where firms invest mainly for tax reasons. In this subsample,
there remains substantial variation in the rule of law index, which has a standard deviation of 0.60 (compared
to 0.86 in the main estimation sample). The estimated coefficients of the rule of law index and the interaction
effect are positive and significant also in the high-income sample.
In the last two columns of Table 7, we turn to the full panel of ownership shares that we observe biannu-
ally for 2004-2014. By pooling these data, we substantially increase the sample and can additionally exploit
43This definition reflects the notion that subsidiaries active in a different industry from their parent are less likely to replicate
the activity of the HQ, but instead the two firms find themselves at different positions along the (vertical) value chain. The same
definition has been used for instance by Alfaro and Charlton (2009) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2015). As noted in footnote 10, our
theoretical argument does not presuppose the existence of supply-use relationships between the two firms.
44As a threshold, we choose the median GDP per capita across all subsidiary countries from the main estimation sample. This is
a very high threshold, as the country just below the median is Spain.
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the time variation in ownership shares for identification. Note that we control for large sets of time-varying
FE in addition to all the observable control variables from Table 1 in column 5, and we further extend the
set of FE in the last column. These panel regressions confirm our positive and significant estimates for the
rule of law index and the interaction effect with relationship-specificity.
4.3.4 SELECTION INTO COUNTRIES
In our main analysis, we have taken the location of the subsidiary as given and focused on the HQ’s choice
of the integration intensity. As predicted by our theoretical model, we find that differences in contracting
institutions across countries shape the intensity of integration. However, a HQ’s location choice, i.e., the
selection of the production country, is also likely to be driven by contracting institutions and other country
characteristics. Under certain conditions, this location choice can affect our analysis of the intensive margin
of integration. In particular, one may envision that in practice, the HQ solves a two-stage decision problem,
choosing first whether or not to produce in a given country, and in the second stage, deciding on the depth of
integration (the optimal ownership share). Depending on what explains the location choice, such a decision
structure might introduce selection bias to our estimations. Note that the direction of this bias is a priori
unclear, as it depends on how the variables that drive selection in the first stage are correlated with the
ownership shares and our key explanatory variables.
To address this issue, we estimate two-stage models that apply the selection correction proposed by
Heckman (1979). The first-stage selection equation explains a dummy Oh`, which indicates whether or not
we observe ownership shares (of at least 10%) of HQ h in any subsidiary in country `, by the following
probit regression:
Pr(Oh` = 1|Vh`) =   (⌫ ·Vh`) , (20)
whereby Pr denotes probability and  (·) is the standard normal distribution function. The vector Vh`
(with associated coefficient vector ⌫) includes all the country-specific and country-pair specific variables
contained in Xhm from equation (18) (see column 6 of Table 1) as well as HQ country and industry FE.
In addition, following the approach by Helpman et al. (2008), we include in Vh` a ‘religious distance’
variable, which captures the dissimilarity in the religious beliefs across country pairs.45 This approach
reflects the idea that similar religious beliefs may induce people to engage in economic activity and invest in
the other country, while we have no reason to believe that they also affect the intensity of integration. Since
the religious distance variable is excluded in the second-stage models, it contributes to identification. Given
that we do not observe the HQ’s business partners in countries for which the dummyOh` is equal to zero, we
add one observation withOh` = 0 for each country not selected by a given HQ. Since this procedure inflates
the dataset with zeros, estimating equation (20) for the entire sample reaches computational limits, so we
estimate it instead by HQ country or group of countries.46 From the probabilities predicted by equation (20),
45Our ‘religious distance’ variable is taken from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) and represents a population-weighted measure
of the similarity of religions based on a categorization by the World Christian Database (chosen to maximize country coverage in
the Orbis data). We set religious distance to zero for domestic pairs.
46Depending on the number of observations per country in Orbis, we estimate equation (20) separately for 29 individual HQ
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we compute the inverse Mills ratio (IMR), the so-called non-selection hazard. The IMR is then included in
the second-stage models, given by equations (18) and (19), to correct for potential selection bias.
The estimation results from the two-stage Heckman models provide some evidence for the relevance of
selection and strengthen our previous findings. The unreported first-stage probit regressions reveal for most
of the HQ countries (or groups of countries) that religious distance tends to decrease the probability of an
ownership link, in line with expectations. Furthermore, we find in most cases that subsidiaries are more
likely to be observed in countries with a higher rule of law index. The second-stage regressions are reported
in Table 8, which repeats for convenience the baseline results (from the last columns of Tables 1 and 2) in the
first two columns. The added IMR in columns 3 and 4 turns out to be significant, indicating a selection bias
in the absence of a correction. More precisely, the coefficient of the IMR is weakly negative in column 3,
and it is positive and significant in the preferred model of column 4, which includes also country-pair FE.
Most importantly, the estimates for the effects of rule of law and its interaction with relationship-specificity
are positive and highly significant in these Heckman regressions. Moreover, the interaction effect is larger
than the baseline estimate, indicating a downward bias due to selection. Hence, our main estimate without
the selection correction is conservative in the sense that it tends to underestimate the positive interaction
effect of contracting institutions and relationship-specificity on ownership shares.
TABLE 8: Selection into countries
Dep. var.: ownership share Baseline Heckman correction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rule of law 11.12*** 10.80***
(2.540) (2.528)
Rule of law ⇥ specificity 3.432*** 3.769***
(0.909) (1.062)
IMR -1.965* 1.654**
(1.150) (0.805)
Observations 433,108 186,110 432,954 152,567
R2 0.278 0.295 0.278 0.303
Columns 1 and 3 report estimates of equation (18), including all the control variables and FE from column 6 of Table 1. Columns 2
and 4 report estimates of equation (19), including all the control variables and FE from column 6 of Table 2. Columns 1 and 2
repeat the baseline estimates. In columns 3 and 4, we correct for selection by including the inverse Mills ratio (IMR), predicted
by probit regressions of equation (20), estimated separately for 29 HQ countries or country groups. Standard errors clustered by
subsidiary country and by HQ (columns 1 and 3) or by subsidiary country-industry and by HQ (columns 2 and 4) are reported in
parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
4.3.5 ORDERED LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR OWNERSHIP CATEGORIES
There are two potential concerns related to the use of linear estimation methods in our baseline analysis.
First, the linear model might not be ideally suited to explain the ownership share Shm, which lies between
zero and one, because it does not respect the variable’s natural upper and lower bounds. As a symptom of
this issue, OLS estimation may yield predicted values outside the unit interval, which is the case for a small
share of observations in our preferred specification of equation (19). Second, OLS estimation does not allow
for non-linear effects of the explanatory variables on ownership shares, although such non-linearities may be
countries or groups of countries, defined by the world regions indicated in Table B.1.
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relevant in practice. For instance, there may be critical threshold values of the ownership share above which
the owner obtains additional control rights. In terms of our model, one might envisage that full residual
control rights over non-contractible inputs lie with the party that owns more than 50% of the firm. Similarly,
the HQ may face additional obstacles when trying to exercise her residual control rights unless she owns
100% of the subsidiary. It is therefore conceivable that a firm’s choice between ownership categories, such
as majority and full ownership, is more sensitive to judicial quality compared to the choice of ownership
shares within an ownership category (e.g. between 63% and 64%), implying non-linearities.
To address both of these concerns, we estimate an ordered logistic (henceforth, ordered logit) regression
model using maximum likelihood methods. The dependent variable in this model is the categorical variable
S˜, which takes on three distinct values for categories of ownership shares: 1 for minority (10-49.99%), 2
for majority (50-99.99%), and 3 for full ownership (100%). The ordered logit model, which describes the
probabilities that the ownership share Shm lies in each category, is specified as follows:
Pr(S˜ = 1|Zhm) = ⇤( 1   ⇠Zhm) (21)
Pr(S˜ = 2|Zhm) = ⇤( 2   ⇠Zhm)  ⇤( 1   ⇠Zhm) (22)
Pr(S˜ = 3|Zhm) = 1  ⇤( 2   ⇠Zhm) (23)
where ⇤(·) is the logistic function, Zhm is the vector of all explanatory variables from the preferred specifi-
cation of equation (19), and  1,  2, as well as ⇠ are the parameters to be estimated. This modeling approach
allows us to take into account the natural upper and lower bounds of ownership shares and to address po-
tential non-linearities. On the downside, the approach ignores the variation in ownership shares within each
category, which amounts to assuming that institutions play a negligible role for explaining the choice of
ownership within categories. Therefore, the ordered logit model constitutes an important robustness check,
but it is not strictly preferable to our baseline approach. When estimating the model, we further need to apply
two changes compared to our baseline estimation due to technical limitations. First, to keep the model com-
putationally feasible, we cannot account for country-industry FE for the HQ, but instead include FE by HQ
industry and by country pair. Second, standard errors are clustered only by the subsidiary’s country-industry
combination.
Figure 3 illustrates the ordered logit estimation results in terms of so-called ‘average marginal effects’
(AMEs) of rule of law on the probability that the ownership share lies in different categories, which are
evaluated at three values of relationship-specificity (0, 0.5, and 1). These AMEs are obtained by computing
the predicted effect of a marginal improvement in rule of law on the ownership share for each firm pair,
at the observed levels of all other covariates, and averaging these marginal effects across all observations
for a given category of relationship-specificity (using Stata’s margins command). Consider first the solid
line, representing the AMEs of rule of law on full ownership. The point estimates are significantly positive
for intermediate and high relationship-specificity and increasing in the latter. By contrast, the AMEs of
rule of law on minority and majority ownership (the dashed and dotted lines, respectively) are estimated
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FIGURE 3: Average marginal effects from ordered logit model for ownership categories
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Note: The figure depicts estimated average marginal effects (AMEs) of rule of law by relationship-specificity from the ordered
logit regression model specified in equations (21) to (23), alongside 95% confidence intervals. The solid line represents the AMEs
of rule of law on the probability of full ownership (Shm = 1), the dashed line represents the AMEs of rule of law on the proba-
bility of majority ownership (Shm 2 [0.5, 0.9999]), and the dotted line represents the AMEs of rule of law on the probability of
minority ownership (Shm 2 [0.1, 0.4999]). Standard errors are clustered at the subsidiary country-industry level. The number of
observations is 187,605 and the pseudo R2 is 0.2215.
to be negative and decreasing in relationship-specificity. Somewhat surprisingly, there is no noticeable
difference in the AMEs between minority and majority ownership. Note, however, that these AMEs cannot
be considered in isolation, but need to be interpreted relative to the other ownership categories. Taken
together, the estimates suggest that better contracting institutions increase the propensity for HQ to choose
full ownership relative to lower ownership shares, and this effect is stronger in industries with a higher
relationship-specificity. Hence, the ordered logit estimates support our main hypotheses. They further add
the insight that, empirically, better institutions particularly favor full ownership over joint ventures.
4.3.6 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES
Since we regress micro-level ownership shares on aggregate variables, measured at the levels of indus-
tries and countries, reverse causality does not appear to be a relevant issue when estimating equations (18)
and (19). We might, however, imagine that the government of a country which has attracted many large for-
eign investments (in relationship-specific industries) would have particularly strong incentives to improve
the quality of domestic contracting institutions. While a large bulk of foreign investment need not be re-
flected in high average ownership shares at the firm level, we nevertheless address the possibility of reverse
causality by using instrumental variables (IV). We adopt the standard approach of using the historic origin
of a country’s legal system as an IV for the rule of law index (see Nunn, 2007). For this purpose, we rely on
the classification of legal origins developed by La Porta et al. (1998) and revised by La Porta et al. (2008)
into British common law or civil law of French, German, or Scandinavian origin.47 We choose British com-
47The original classification includes the Socialist tradition as a fifth category. La Porta et al. (2008) reclassify the Socialist
countries by French or German civil law, from which their legal systems originated and to which many of them reverted after the
break-up of the Soviet Union. We follow this revised approach.
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mon law as the base category and use three indicator variables for the other categories. Since legal origins
are pre-determined, they are exogenous to ownership structures and can therefore resolve a possible reverse
causality issue. In addition, the IV approach also tackles other potential biases due to omitted variables,
discussed Section 4.3.2, or due to measurement error in our proxy for contracting institutions.
TABLE 9: Instrumental variables
First-order effect Interaction effect
First stage Second stage First stage Second stage
Dep. var. in the header: Rule of law Ownership share Rule of law ⇥ Ownership share
specificity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rule of law 13.29**
(5.320)
Rule of law ⇥ specificity 3.524**
(1.437)
French legal origin dummy -0.587***
(0.155)
German legal origin dummy -0.0123
(0.0895)
Scandinavian legal origin dummy -0.480*
(0.253)
French legal origin ⇥ specificity -1.126***
(0.0774)
German legal origin ⇥ specificity -0.547***
(0.0784)
Scandinavian legal origin ⇥ specificity 0.125*
(0.0730)
Observations 433,108 433,108 186,110 186,110
Partial R2 (excluded IV) 0.331 0.429
F-statistic (excluded IV, Kleibergen-Paap) 11.15 110.7
P-value of F-test 0.0000 0.0000
The table reports estimation results of 2SLS regressions. Column 1 reports the first-stage estimates and column 2 reports the
second-stage estimates of equation (18), in which we instrument rule of law by a set of legal origin dummies, including all
the control variables and FE from column 6 of Table 1. Column 3 reports the first-stage estimates and column 4 reports the
second-stage estimates of equation (19), where we instrument the interaction of rule of law⇥ specificity by interactions of legal
origin dummies with specificity, including all the control variables and FE from column 6 of Table 2. Standard errors clustered
by subsidiary country and by HQ (columns 1-2) or by subsidiary country-industry and by HQ (columns 3-4) are reported in
parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 9 reports the results of two-stages least squares (2SLS) estimations of our preferred specifications
of equations (18) and (19). The first column reports the first-stage estimation results of regressing the
rule of law index on the legal origin dummies for the subsidiary’s country. It shows that countries with a
legal system of French and Scandinavian origin have a significantly lower rule of law index (conditional on
the covariates), and that these differences explain a substantial share of the variation in judicial quality, as
evidenced by a high partial R2 of 0.33. The F-test for significance of the excluded IV yields a Kleibergen-
Paap F-statistic of 11.15, exceeding the Stock and Yogo (2002) critical value for a 10% maximal IV bias
relative to OLS, so legal origin serves as a strong IV. The second-stage regression in column 2 yields a
positive and significant estimate for the instrumented rule of law index, confirming our previous findings.
In columns 3 and 4, we instrument for the interaction term between the rule of law index and relationship-
specificity in equation (19) using interactions of legal origin dummies with relationship-specificity. The first-
stage regression (column 3) reveals that these interaction terms are both individually and jointly significant,
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with a very high F-statistic of the excluded IV and a partial R2 of 0.43. In the second-stage regression,
summarized in column 4, we find a positive and significant interaction effect of a similar magnitude as in
the OLS estimations, which supports Proposition 2.
4.3.7 PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING
The critical assumption for the validity of the IV approach to estimating equation (19) is that the historical
origins of countries’ legal systems have no differential effect (by relationship-specificity) on firm boundaries
in 2014 other than through contracting institutions, conditional on all control variables. This exclusion
restriction may be violated if legal origins are correlated with other cultural or institutional characteristics
that also shape firm boundaries differentially across industries. Such a violation of the exclusion restriction
might be the reason for the slightly larger estimate of the interaction effect in our 2SLS regression compared
to OLS, which is in conflict with the upward bias of OLS that we would expect due to reverse causality.48 To
address a potential violation of the exclusion restriction, we continue to follow Nunn (2007) and implement
Propensity Score Matching (PSM). The idea of PSM, which goes back to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983,
1984), is to select observations from treatment and control groups that are similar based on observable
characteristics, assuming that they are also similar in terms of unobservables.
In our application, we seek to compare similar firm pairs involving subsidiaries in countries with favor-
able and unfavorable contracting institutions. Therefore, we select all observations of subsidiaries located
in countries whose legal system is of British origin (Lhm = 1), which has been shown to be most favorable
for investors, and match them to the most comparable observation of a subsidiary located in a country with
French legal origin (Lhm = 0) in the same industry. Comparability is determined by the propensity score,
i.e., the predicted value of the indicator Phm, as explained by the following probit regression:
Phm = Pr(Lhm = 1|Whm) =  (⇣ ·Whm +  hm), (24)
where we match observations on the variables summarized in the vectorWhm (with associated coefficients
⇣), and  hm is an error term. In the baseline PSM approach,Whm includes the following variables: GDP
per capita of the subsidiary’s country, capital intensity and intangible assets intensity of the HQ’s industry, a
dummy variable for domestic (vs. international) ownership links, and ln employment of the subsidiary firm.49
Capital intensity and intangible assets intensity serve as proxies for the relative importance of the HQ’s
inputs in the production process, an important determinant of the severity of hold-up problems identified in
the incomplete-contracts literature (see Antràs, 2015, and our model extension in Section 2.4.2). To better
control for firm heterogeneity, we then vary the set of matching variablesWhm by successively adding the
following characteristics of the subsidiary firm: age, capital intensity, and the shareholder dummy. Based
48An alternative, less problematic explanation is that the IV approach corrects for a downward bias in the OLS estimates due to
measurement error or omitted variables.
49Capital intensity is defined as the logarithm of total capital over total employment, and intangible assets intensity is defined as
the logarithm of total intangible assets over total fixed assets, both measured in the HQ’s industry in 2013. The firm-level variables
are defined in Section 4.3.2.
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on the predicted propensity score bPhm from equation (24), we match observations within a given subsidiary
industry with their so-called ‘nearest neighbor’ (with replacement), i.e., the single observation with the most
similar propensity score, while restricting observations to the common support.50
For the matched observations, we construct the ratio of ownership shares for the subsidiary in the British
legal origin country (B) over the one located in the French legal origin country (F ). The logarithm of this
ratio is then regressed on our preferred measure of relationship-specificity Ri:
ln (ShmB/ShmF ) =  1 +  2 ·Ri + ⇠hmBF , (25)
with coefficients  1 and  2, and an error term ⇠hmBF . Standard errors are clustered at the level of the
industry i in which subsidiarym is active. Since the contracting institutions in British legal origin countries
are more favorable for investors, Proposition 2 would predict higher ownership shares for subsidiaries in
these countries producing more relationship-specific goods, which translates into an estimate b 2 > 0.
Table 10 reports our results from estimating equation (25). We start in column 1 by combining all
possible observations in the same industry involving subsidiaries from a British and a French legal origin
country, which results in almost 100 million pairs of observations. The regression reveals a positive estimate
for the coefficient of relationship-specificity, confirming our intuition based on the PRT. However, ownership
shares may differ between these pairs for a variety of reasons other than legal origins. Therefore, we restrict
the analysis to matched firm-pair observations, which are similar in terms of the variables contained in
Whm. For all variants ofWhm, we find estimates b 2 which are positive and significant (at least at the ten
percent level) in columns 2-5. These estimates, which lie in the range of 0.44-0.62, are smaller than in the
unmatched sample. This finding is in line with the expected direction of a bias that would arise from reverse
causality or from omitted variables positively correlated with contracting institutions. Overall, the PSM
results lend further support to our main hypothesis that better contracting institutions increase the depth of
integration between firms more strongly in relationship-specific industries.
TABLE 10: Propensity score matching
Dep. var.: ln (ShmB/ShmF ) Unmatched Baseline PSM + Age + Capital int. + Shareholder
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specificity (subsidiary industry) 0.907*** 0.442* 0.619*** 0.504*** 0.451**
(0.310) (0.232) (0.228) (0.189) (0.195)
Observations 94,959,461 9,578 9,571 7,078 7,070
R2 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
The table reports estimates of equation (25). The first column considers the unmatched sample of all possible combinations of
observations involving one subsidiary in a British and one in a French legal origin country. Columns 2-5 are restricted to the
sample of (nearest neighbor) pairs matched based on the propensity score predicted by variants of equation (24). In column 2,
observations are matched via the following variables: GDP per capita of the subsidiary’s country, capital intensity and intangible
assets intensity of the HQ’s industry, a dummy variable for domestic ownership links, and ln employment of the subsidiary firm.
Columns 3-5 successively add to equation (24) the subsidiary firm variables listed in the header. Standard errors clustered by
subsidiary industry are reported in parentheses. Asterisks indicate significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
50Formally, we choose for each observation involving a subsidiary with British legal origin the observation involving a subsidiary
with French legal origin in the same industry i for which the absolute difference in propensity scores is smallest. This procedure
is implemented by the Stata module psmatch2 provided by Leuven and Sianesi (2015). A similar approach has been adopted by
Ma et al. (2010) using firm-level data.
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The fundamental role of contractual imperfections in shaping firm boundaries is widely accepted in the
economic discipline. However, there is no consensus on whether reducing these imperfections eventually
leads to more deeply integrated firms or a stronger reliance on markets. We contribute to this debate by
developing a generalized Property-Rights Theory of the firm, which suggests that better contracting institu-
tions increase the willingness of headquarters to obtain a larger ownership share in their subsidiaries, and
that this effect is particularly pronounced in industries with a high degree of relationship-specificity. Using
unique micro data on global ownership links across firm pairs, we find strong empirical support for these
predictions. Our findings are confirmed for a variety of different measures of contracting institutions and
relationship-specificity. They are also robust to controlling for a host of unobservable factors and industry-
specific effects of economic development or other institutions. Finally, we corroborate our results by using
legal origins as an exogenous source of institutional quality in instrumental variables and propensity score
matching techniques.
What are the policy implications of our findings? Policymakers in developing countries may hope to
attract foreign direct investment by improving the quality of domestic contracting institutions. Perhaps
surprisingly, the Transaction-Cost Theory would suggest that such improvements discourage (rather than
encourage) foreign ownership, since they facilitate market-based transactions and thus undermine the in-
centive for FDI. This paper has demonstrated that the Property-Rights Theory confirms the policymakers’
intuition: Better contracting institutions should induce investors to choose higher degrees of integration.
This intuition is strongly supported by our extensive empirical analysis of global firm pairs. Furthermore,
we show that an improvement of contracting institutions has a particularly strong effect on the integration
intensity in industries with a high degree of relationship-specificity. Since relationship-specific industries
are typically also characterized by high technology and information content, improving judicial quality may
entail further favorable outcomes through spillovers from FDI.
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A MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
A.1 PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINT
Utilizing equations (4), (6), (8), (11), (12), (13), and (15), as well as the definition of ↵ =   1  in equa-
tion (10), we obtain after simplification the sufficient condition for which the optimal ownership share s⇤
from the viewpoint of H does not violateM ’s participation constraint:
 [⇢+  (1  ⇢)] + µ2(    1)2(1   )(1  ⇢)  µ(    1)
h
  [1  2⇢   (1  ⇢)]  (1   )(1  ⇢)
i
  0.
A tedious but straightforward analysis shows that this inequality is more likely to hold the higher ⇢ and  ,
less likely to hold the higher  , and is ambiguously affected by a change in µ. To assess the overall likelihood
of this inequality to hold for various combinations of parameter values, we fix the value of   and depict all
possible combinations of   2 (0, 1) and µ, ⇢ 2 [0, 1] which fulfill the above-mentioned condition with
equality. The value of   = 2.25 assumed in Figure A.1(a) is the mean value in Crozet and Koenig (2010),
obtained from estimating a structural model of international trade using French firm-level data. The plane
depicted in this figure illustrates the parameter combinations for which M ’s PC is fulfilled with equality,
while it is slack (i.e., ⇡M > 0) for any combination of  , µ, and ⇢ above this plane, and it would be violated
(i.e., ⇡M < 0) below this plane. As can be seen from Figure A.1(a), M ’s PC is fulfilled (and can hence
be ignored) for the vast majority of parameter values. In Figure A.1(b), we choose an alternative value of
  = 13, reflecting the mean value estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006) for five-digit industries, which
may be considered a rather high value for the average elasticity of substitution. Compared to Figure A.1(a),
M ’s PC is binding for a larger subset of the parameter space. Nevertheless, it is still non-binding for the
vast majority of permissible parameter values.
FIGURE A.1: Combinations of  , µ, and ⇢ which satisfyM ’s PC with equality
(a)   = 2.25 (b)   = 13
I
A.2 EX-ANTE TRANSFERS
Assume that, after the optimal ownership share is chosen (i.e., in period t1), H charges fromM a transfer
(participation fee) T . This transfer can be positive or negative, and it ensures that M is just indifferent
between participating in the current relationship and obtaining his ex-ante outside option (normalized to
zero).51 Formally, the equilibrium transfer satisfies the following condition:
⇡M   T = 0 (A.1)
whereby ⇡M is given by equation (5). Since the transfer is conducted in t1, it does not affect M ’s maxi-
mization problem in period t3. Hence, the optimal amount of non-contractible inputs mn continues to be
given by equation (6).
Under consideration of the ex-ante transfer,H’s pure profit reads ⇡HT = ⇡H + T , whereby ⇡H is given
by equation (9) and T is determined by equation (A.1). H’s objective function in period t2 reads:
max
{m(i)}µi=0
⇡HT = R  (1  µ)mn  
Z µ
0
m(i)di, (A.2)
wherebymn is given by equation (6). Notice that, in the presence of ex-ante transfers,H reaps the entire sur-
plus from the relationship. Using equations (6), (7), and (8), the maximization problem from equation (A.2)
yields the optimal amount of contractible inputs:
m(i) = ✓↵R ⌘ mc 8i 2 [0, µ],
as a function of equilibrium revenue (obtained from plugging equation (A.2) into equation (7)):
R =  
↵(1 µ)
1 ↵ ✓
↵µ
1 ↵↵
↵
1 ↵D, (A.3)
whereby
✓ ⌘ 1 + s(1  ⇢)   (1  ⇢)  ↵(1   )(1  µ)
[1  ↵(1  µ)] [1 + s(1  ⇢)   (1  ⇢)] . (A.4)
In period t1, H maximizes ⇡HT = R   (1   µ) ↵R   µ✓↵R via the choice of s, whereby  , R, and
✓ are given by equations (8), (A.3), and (A.4), respectively. The first-order condition of this maximization
problem yields the following optimal ownership share:
s⇤ =   ⇢ 
1  ⇢ ,
which is negative. To understand the intuition behind this result, notice from equation (8) that s⇤ =   ⇢ 1 ⇢
would fully eliminateM ’s underinvestment (since  |s=s⇤ = 1). With ex-ante transfers,H obtains the entire
surplus from the relationship and maximizes the overall surplus by choosing the lowest possible ownership
share, which is equal to zero regardless of contracting institutions.
51This assumption can be justified by assuming an infinitely elastic supply ofM agents competing for a given relationship.
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A.3 HEADQUARTER INTENSITY
M ’s maximization problem in period t3 continues to be given by equation (5). Bearing in mind the new
production function from equation (16), this maximization problem deliversM ’s reaction function:
m(i) = (1  ⌘) ↵R ⌘ mn 8i 2 [µ, 1], (A.5)
whereby   is given by equation (8). In t3, H chooses the amount of h which maximizes her share of the
quasi-rent from equation (4) minus production costs of headquarter services: max⇡H =  Q   h.52 This
maximization problem yields the optimal amount of non-contractible headquarter services:
hn = ⌘ ↵R, (A.6)
as a function of revenue (obtained from plugging equations (16), (A.5), and (A.6) into equation (1)):
R =
 
exp
Z µ
0
lnm(i)di
 ↵(1 ⌘)
 ↵⌘  ↵(1 ⌘)(1 µ) ↵↵[1 µ(1 ⌘)](1  ⌘) ↵µ(1 ⌘)D1 ↵
! 1
1 ↵[1 µ(1 ⌘)]
.
(A.7)
In t2, H chooses the amount of contractible inputs that maximizes her profit:
max
{m(i)}µi=0
⇡H = (1  ⇢)s(1  µ)mn + (1  ⇢)
Z µ
0
m(i)di+  Q 
Z µ
0
m(i)di  hn, (A.8)
subject to M ’s participation constraint (⇡M   0), whereby mn, hn, and R are given by equations (A.5),
(A.6), and (A.7), respectively. To keep the exposition as simple as possible, we assume in what follows that
M ’s PC is fulfilled. It should be noted, however, that our results continue to hold in case of a binding PC.
Utilizing equations (4), (A.5), (A.6), and (A.7) in equation (A.8), and solving H’s maximization problem
yields the optimal amount of contractible manufacturing inputs and the associated revenue:
m(i) = (1  ⌘)↵R ⌘ mc 8i 2 [0, µ], R =  
↵(1 µ)
1 ↵ 
↵µ
1 ↵↵
↵
1 ↵D, (A.9)
whereby
 ⌘     ↵[ ⌘    (1  ⇢)(1  µ)(s   )]
[(1  ⇢)  + ⇢]
h
1  ↵ [1  µ(1  ⌘)]
i , (A.10)
and   is given by equation (8).
In t1, H chooses the optimal ownership share by solving the following maximization problem:
max
s
⇡H = (1  ⇢)s(1  µ) ↵R  ⇢µ↵R+  [R  (1  ⇢)(1  µ) ↵R  (1  ⇢)µ↵R]  ⌘ ↵R.
Utilizing equations (8), (A.9), and (A.10) therein, we obtain from the first-order condition the optimal
ownership share presented in equation (17).
52Recall that h is assumed to be fully relationship-specific, and hence, it does not affectH’s outside option.
III
B DATA APPENDIX
TABLE B.1: List of countries by rule of law index and average ownership shares
Rank ISO Rule of law Subsidiaries Average share Rank ISO Rule of law Subsidiaries Average share
1 FINm 1.94 6,040 87.59 64 GHAa -0.19 7 80.33
2 DNKm 1.92 10,161 80.24 65 BMUc -0.19 176 41.68
3 NORm 1.87 14,571 76.55 66 MKDh -0.24 321 59.43
4 NZLb 1.84 1,946 88.55 67 MARa -0.27 310 76.59
5 CHEj 1.84 9,814 82.54 68 BGRh -0.29 3,277 76.78
6 SWEm 1.81 19,203 89.27 69 BRAc -0.29 6,043 62.98
7 NLD 1.80 35,248 94.86 70 INDe -0.30 9,731 60.26
8 AUT 1.78 11,998 78.03 71 SENa -0.31 60 79.16
9 AUSb 1.75 8,016 84.45 72 TUNa -0.33 1 15.83
10 LUX 1.72 2,505 82.86 73 TTOc -0.34 5 42.00
11 SGPf 1.71 2,115 85.47 74 LKAe -0.36 612 77.58
12 CAN 1.71 2,231 58.71 75 THAf -0.36 3,045 60.76
13 GBRl 1.71 60,985 93.33 76 SRBh -0.37 1,858 76.73
14 HKGd 1.67 4,147 82.80 77 BIHh -0.42 688 72.59
15 DEU 1.67 62,260 79.02 78 MHLb -0.43 13 51.13
16 IRL 1.62 3,582 85.58 79 ZMBa -0.47 9 84.73
17 LIEj 1.57 44 95.00 80 MDAi -0.49 156 64.90
18 ISLm 1.54 615 72.87 81 MWIa -0.51 3 40.40
19 USA 1.43 27,863 55.62 82 VNMf -0.52 626 59.50
20 JPN 1.41 41,368 51.73 83 JAMc -0.53 13 51.26
21 BEL 1.33 14,519 75.30 84 PHLf -0.54 1,016 69.96
22 FRA 1.28 59,175 79.59 85 CHNd -0.55 16,691 69.78
23 ESTi 1.18 1,644 81.87 86 COLc -0.56 1,059 69.88
24 MLTn 1.02 567 60.81 87 IDNf -0.56 213 59.73
25 TWNd 1.01 2,016 57.34 88 ALBh -0.59 125 73.26
26 CZE 0.94 7,800 83.70 89 DOMc -0.60 1 20.00
27 PRTn 0.94 10,168 71.71 90 TZAa -0.62 30 68.97
28 ISRg 0.91 2,405 72.28 91 MEXc -0.67 79 58.90
29 CYPh 0.87 335 71.74 92 KENa -0.67 12 46.17
30 BRBc 0.86 4 56.56 93 GABa -0.72 1 58.28
31 QATg 0.79 30 53.60 94 SLVc -0.73 3 50.01
32 KOR 0.79 5,764 64.97 95 BFAa -0.75 1 51.00
33 SVNh 0.78 1,463 69.67 96 KAZg -0.77 4,447 85.42
34 ESP 0.74 38,436 70.43 97 PERc -0.77 684 68.46
35 MUSa 0.72 86 61.23 98 CUBc -0.79 32 57.82
36 LTUi 0.71 1,266 81.08 99 GUYc -0.81 2 20.00
37 LVAi 0.67 1,377 82.06 100 EGYa -0.82 250 63.14
38 POLi 0.62 13,165 80.12 101 CIVa -0.83 16 73.21
39 AREg 0.51 201 72.85 102 NPLe -0.90 2 65.00
40 URYc 0.48 3 77.67 103 PRYc -0.90 5 76.31
41 MYSf 0.44 6,091 76.76 104 RUS -0.93 36,431 70.15
42 BWAa 0.44 5 44.57 105 BGDe -0.94 12 48.55
43 CYMc 0.41 171 48.31 106 DZAa -0.95 91 67.44
44 OMNg 0.38 57 40.92 107 MDGa -0.96 1 100.00
45 CPVa 0.37 2 22.76 108 LBNg -0.98 18 67.68
46 CRIc 0.31 5 80.49 109 PAKe -1.00 141 60.07
47 HUNi 0.30 5,560 81.93 110 UKRi -1.01 9,969 74.00
48 JORg 0.28 51 47.70 111 BLRi -1.03 31 70.02
49 SVK 0.27 3,204 82.22 112 MOZa -1.06 2 36.45
50 BHRg 0.25 32 43.02 113 LBRa -1.07 2 16.16
51 GRCh 0.14 2,299 70.38 114 ARGc -1.13 842 69.66
52 ITA 0.13 45,664 63.92 115 BDIa -1.16 1 10.00
53 HRVh 0.11 1,708 84.46 116 GTMc -1.21 1 100.00
54 SAUg 0.06 312 62.02 117 IRNg -1.26 14 47.10
55 GEOg 0.00 51 88.59 118 ECUc -1.28 74 75.36
56 ZAFa -0.05 1,825 82.83 119 BOLc -1.30 6 51.84
57 ROUh -0.06 5,227 76.15 120 UZBg -1.31 9 48.46
58 NAMa -0.07 4 75.50 121 NGAa -1.31 21 52.40
59 KNAa -0.12 2 20.10 122 AGOa -1.32 1 51.00
60 RWAa -0.13 5 83.34 123 SYRg -1.57 2 99.98
61 MNEh -0.14 100 67.49 124 IRQg -1.59 34 86.37
62 KWTg -0.16 77 57.21 125 ZWEa -1.65 3 36.46
63 TURg -0.17 5,818 65.41 126 VENc -2.13 4 70.85
The table lists ISO country codes, sorted in descending order by the rule of law index, the number of subsidiaries in our data, and the average
direct ownership share by country. Lower average ownership shares are highlighted in darker shades of gray. Countries grouped by world
regions for the selection model in Section 4.3.4 are indicated by: a Africa, b Oceania, c Latin America and Caribbean, d China, Taiwan,
and Hong Kong, e South Asia, f South East Asia, g Central and South West Asia, h South East Europe, i Eastern Europe, j Switzerland
and Liechtenstein, k France and Monaco, l UK incl. Gibraltar, m Northern Europe, n South West Europe.
IV
TABLE B.2: Summary statistics for main estimation sample
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Direct ownership share (percent, Orbis) 230,937 74.805 29.813 10 100
Rule of law index (Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank) 230,937 0.87 0.914 -1.595 1.944
Specificity (baseline, subsidiary industry, based on Rauch, 1999) 230,937 0.949 0.162 0 1
ln GDP (subsidiary country, 2010, PWT) 230,772 14.053 1.29 7.636 16.38
ln GDP per capita (subsidiary country, 2010, PWT) 230,772 10.086 0.559 6.013 11.655
ln capital-labor ratio (K`/L`) (subsidiary country, 2010, PWT) 188,120 7.86 0.974 2.846 9.756
ln years of schooling (subsidiary country, 2010, PWT) 230,153 1.103 0.112 0.538 1.286
ln capital intensity ln (Ki/Li) (subsidiary country, Orbis) 230,937 3.277 0.988 -3.061 8.616
ln distance (km, CEPII) 229,770 5.978 1.203 1.007 9.883
Contiguity dummy (CEPII) 229,770 0.048 0.214 0 1
Common language dummy (CEPII) 229,770 0.042 0.2 0 1
Time zone difference (hours, CEPII) 229,101 0.517 1.81 0 12
Colonial link dummy (CEPII) 229,770 0.02 0.14 0 1
Domestic ownership link dummy (Orbis) 230,937 0.798 0.402 0 1
Number of subsidiaries (headquarter, Orbis) 230,937 15.191 41.898 1 888
Number of shareholders (subsidiary, Orbis) 230,937 1.914 3.83 1 421
Financial development (subsidiary country, GFDD) 200,438 182.055 70.789 13.804 582.734
Labor market flexibility (subsidiary country, World Bank) 230,734 0.633 0.168 0.352 1
IPR protection index (subsidiary country, Park, 2008) 223,467 1.112 0.459 -2.253 1.696
Expropriation risk (IHS Markit) 230,349 -.502 0.538 -1.358 3.868
Contract enforcement (IHS Markit) 230,349 0.771 0.626 -3.179 1.481
Law and order (PRS) 230,287 0.771 0.687 -1.61 1.824
Enforcing contracts (WBDB) 230,817 0.7 0.839 -2.837 2.245
Legal formalism index (Djankov et al., 2003) 227,727 0.178 0.682 -2.174 2.667
Property rights freedom (Heritage foundation) 230,809 0.798 0.943 -1.559 1.88
Enforceability of contracts (BERI) 197,694 0.558 0.912 -1.61 1.782
Specificity (conservative, subsidiary industry, based on Rauch, 1999) 230,937 0.966 0.114 0.114 1
Specificity (differentiated, subsidiary industry, based on Rauch, 1999) 230,937 0.722 0.379 0 1
Relationship duration (years/10, Orbis) 230,937 0.255 0.306 0 1
ln employment (subsidiary, Orbis) 109,421 3.727 1.573 0 11.658
ln (value added/ employment) (subsidiary, Orbis) 57,877 4.429 1.039 -6.136 13.333
ln (capital/ employment) (subsidiary, Orbis) 100,649 2.188 2.478 -7.767 14.708
ln (value added/ employment) (subsidiary, Orbis) 134,290 0.693 0.364 0 1
Shareholder dummy (subsidiary, Orbis) 144,545 0.287 0.452 0 1
Firm age (subsidiary, Orbis) 143,679 19.495 18.241 0 813
The table reports summary statistics of all variables used in the empirical analysis for the full estimation sample of Table 2.
TABLE B.3: Alternative proxies for the quality of contracting institutions
Measure Source Description
Contract enforcement IHS Markit Inverse measure of the “risk that the judicial system will not
enforce contractual agreements between private-sector entities”
(2014, first quarter).
Law and order Political Risk Services (PRS) This component of the International Country Risk Guide is de-
signed to measure “the strength and impartiality of the legal sys-
tem” and “popular observance of the law” (2014).
Enforcing contracts World Bank Doing Business
(WBDB)
The distance to the frontier in enforcing contracts reflects the
“time, cost and procedural complexity to resolve a standardized
commercial dispute between two domestic businesses” involving
“the breach of a sales contract” (2014).
Legal formalism Djankov et al. (2003) The index “measures substantive and procedural statutory inter-
vention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts”.
Property rights freedom Heritage foundation The index reflects a “qualitative assessment of the extent to which
a country’s legal framework allows individuals to freely accumu-
late private property, secured by clear laws that are enforced ef-
fectively by the government” (2014).
Enforceability of contracts Business Environmental Risk
Intelligence (BERI)
Measures the “relative degree to which contractual agreements are
honored and complications presented by language and mentality
differences” (Knack and Keefer, 1995).
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